Towards a Lightweight, Secure, and Untraceable RFID Authentication Protocol by Edelev, Sviatoslav
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science
P H D T H E S I S




for the award of the degree
“Doctor rerum naturalium” (Dr.rer.nat.)
of the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
within the doctoral Program in Computer Science (PCS)








Prof. Dr. Dieter Hogrefe
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Prof. Dr. Xiaoming Fu
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Prof. Dr. Konrad Rieck
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Members of the Examination Board:
Prof. Dr. Dieter Hogrefe (First Reviewer)
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Prof. Dr. Xiaoming Fu (Second Reviewer)
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Prof. Dr. Konrad Rieck
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Prof. Dr. Florentin Wörgötter
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Prof. Dr. Carsten Damm
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Prof. Dr. Ramin Yahyapour
Institute for Computer Science, Georg-August-University Göttingen
Date of the oral examination: 4th September 2015
Towards a Lightweight, Secure, and Untraceable
RFID Authentication Protocol
Abstract: This dissertation tackles the problem of user privacy and security of
transactions in the authentication protocols of the technology of Radio-frequency
identification (RFID).
Radio-frequency identification is ubiquitously used for automatic identification
of objects over the distance. Numerous applications include access control using
contactless ID cards, contactless payments in the public transportation, payments
using contactless credit cards, toll payments, etc. To identify an item, RFID tags
are used. In several other applications, mostly for automatic checkout and fraud
control, tags are embedded into books, clothes, packs of medicines, goods. Such a
widespread of the technology caused that almost everyone carry an item with an
RFID tag inside.
However, many users do not realize that those small chips can reveal valuable
privacy information about them or break the security of the information system.
From the privacy side, RFID-enabled objects make their owners vulnerable to
illegal tracing. This is mainly possible due to eavesdropping and unauthorized
querying, which allows attackers to monitor transactions and link them to objects
and places. The current state-of-art suggests considering an assumption that
attackers can compromise a tag, read its internal state, and use information stored
on the tag’s memory to link the tag with its previous and future transactions.
Moreover, an insecure channel allows attackers to learn, what object one is
carrying, thus breaking anonymity. From the security side, RFID communications
are vulnerable to replay and desynchronization attacks. In the former attack, an
adversary targets to reuse the tag’s response in order to impersonate it and illegally
obtain the benefits. In the latter attack, the adversary targets to desynchronize
identification records between a tag and a valid server so that a valid tag cannot
be identified anymore.
Existing RFID authentication protocols demonstrate a lot of progress covering
the above-mentioned issues. However, they still suffer from limitations and
are vulnerable to certain security and privacy attacks. Moreover, due to their
complexity, most of the schemes do not conform to the EPC Class-1 Gen-2 (C1G2)
Standard and thus cannot be implemented on passive low-cost RFID tags.
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In this dissertation, we aim to comply with the EPC C1G2 Standard and
present a minimalist RFID Authentication protocol based on the Rabin scheme.
Through the detailed security and privacy analysis, we show that the presented
scheme overcomes the flaws of the previous works, provides anonymity, location
privacy, achieves both backward and forward untraceability, and is secure against
impersonation and desynchronization attacks. The proposed protocol also
supports ownership transfer that can be performed over the insecure environment
for tags. The performance comparison shows that our scheme outperforms the
existing works in the amount of communication rounds, calculations on tags
and on the server, and achieves the complexity for database loading of O(1)
in the worst case. The use of lightweight functions makes the scheme efficient,
scalable, and feasible for implementation on simple low-cost tags. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first lightweight protocol that provides forward and
backward untraceability at the same time, and is robust against security and
privacy attacks generally considered in RFID systems.
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1.1 Background
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) deals, as the name suggests, with iden-
tification of objects through the radio interface. Surprisingly, the technology
was born and for the first time used long before the era of wireless networks
and personal computers – it was initially applied during the World War II in
the “Friend-or-Foe” identification systems to distantly recognize friendly military
targets such as aircraft, vehicles, or forces.
The widespread of RFID starts from 1990s when the technology had been
actively used in the supply management for tracking of goods and inventory
purposes, in public transportation payment systems (e.g., in buses, metro, or
ski-lifts), and for animal identification. In RFID, the role of identifier serves
a transponder, called a tag, which contains a unique identification number of
the object to which it is attached. The identifier (ID) of an item is transmitted
wirelessly to the interrogator, or a reader.
The technology is also considered as an enhancement over optically recognizable
barcodes. Indeed, in addition to the increased storage capacity and the ability
to be reprogrammed (unlike barcodes), RFID tags do not need to be within the
line-of-sight to perform identification. Thus, the technology enables automatic
and wireless identification of objects without physical contact to them or manual
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intervention. Moreover, a small size of tags makes it possible to embed them into
consumer items (such as shoes or clothes, watches, etc.), credit cards, and even
implant them into humans and animals. Unlike barcodes that contain information
about the manufacturer and type of a product, RFID tags often come with the
Electronic Product Code (EPC), which contains additionally a globally unique
identifier of the item.
Thanks to the features of automated and wireless identification and low cost
of tags, RFID has faced ubiquitous use in the variety of applications: supply-chain
management, access control systems, theft detection, wireless payments, intelligent
transportation systems, tracking of humans and animals, electronic documents
(e-passports).
All these examples have shifted the problem of identification towards the
problems of sophisticated information systems that use identification as a primary
operation. These systems operate with sensitive data and provide highly important
services being constantly under increased attention of adversaries. Therefore, they
have to be secure and reliable.
Since RFID was designed to provide fast identification of objects, the technology
itself does not provide means to authenticate the parties of a communication
– tags and readers. In particular, tags automatically reveal their identities to
every reader that queries them. Moreover, the open broadcast nature of wireless
communications allows eavesdroppers to intercept messages and, thus, break the
confidentiality of communications. It opens the potential to serious security and
privacy attacks that aim to obtain illegal access to resources, impersonate the
object of identification, or collect private information about it, including the type
of object, its location, and location patterns of its holder.
By placing malicious readers in various locations and hearing the same tag’s
ID at different places, an adversary can track users without their knowledge or
consent. Moreover, from the knowledge of items that a person carries it is possible
to obtain such personal information as one’s interests, political attitude (from the
books one buys, for example) or illnesses (from the medicines). Until protected,
the information transmitted during RFID series of communication (transactions)
remains easy-to-access. Thus, the disclosure of the user location and data from
tags is considered as the main privacy problem in RFID.
In addition to user tracking through eavesdropping or unauthorized querying,
strong attacker models assume that an adversary can compromise a tag and extract
information from its memory in order to link it with previous or future transactions.
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Protocols that are resistant to such privacy attacks are called backward-untraceable
or forward-untraceable, respectively. Lim and Kwon proved [1] that forward-
untraceability is possible to achieve only if an adversary misses at least one valid
transaction between the target tag and a valid server after the compromise.
Another notion closely related to privacy in RFID is ownership transfer. In
its life cycle, a tag may change its physical owners: for example, in the supply
chains goods move between various business partners, are stored in the warehouse,
appear on the supermarket shelf, and finally reach the end consumer. On each
step, once the physical owner is changed, the old owner should have no means to
access a previously owned item. In particular, an old owner should be able neither
to access the content of the tag nor to trace it. Therefore, an RFID authentication
protocol should provide a mechanism to transfer the ownership.
The following security issues are mainly considered in RFID: impersonation
and denial-of-service. Impersonation is usually realized by performing replay
attacks, the target for impersonation is a tag as a bearer of the secret identification
information. Having impersonated a tag, an adversary will be able to illegally
obtain the benefits of the victim tag. This is indeed a serious security problem
as, in this case, an adversary gets access to the resources of the victim such as a
bank account or entrance to the restricted areas. Thus, one of the fundamental
properties of authentication is violated – soundness – meaning that an illegal
entity will be authenticated.
The denial-of-service in regards to the authentication protocols in RFID is
represented by desynchronization attacks. The goal of these attacks is to cause
the mismatch of the identification records on tags and on the authentication
server. Desynchronization attacks are possible to mount in those authentication
protocols that update a tag’s ID to preserve its privacy. An incorrect flow of the
protocol caused by malicious attacker’s actions or transmission errors can lead to
desynchronization of identifiers between a tag and a server. This will lead to a
situation when a valid tag will not be authenticated in the following transactions
by a valid server. In this case, another fundamental property of authentication is
violated – completeness – meaning that a legal entity will not be authenticated
by a valid server.
Apart from security and privacy challenges, another restriction for the devel-
opers are technical capabilities of tags. Current research in RFID authentication
is targeted towards low-cost EPC tags, which are embedded into consumer items.
The low cost of tags brings with it severely restricted capabilities of tags. It is
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commonly considered that EPC tags supply only 2000 Gate Equivalents (GE1)
for security purposes and 10000 GE for the overall gate budget [2]. Such tags
are unable to compute hash functions or complex encryption/decryption opera-
tions. They support only simple arithmetical and logical operations and have a
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG).
Security and privacy issues are one of the main reasons why RFID has not
yet replaced barcodes on the shelves of supermarkets. Another reason is that
every tag, no matter how cheap it is, requires additional costs in comparison
with barcodes, which are produced by printing only. Moreover, privacy advocates
have raised their concerns regarding RFID tags being embedded into clothes,
banknotes, and other belongings and implanted into humans.
In order to foster the rapid development of consumer applications, a strong
attention has been paid to security and privacy issues of RFID in the last decade.
Scientists and research organizations are working towards a secure way of identifi-
cation that would protect the privacy of users and be strong against illegal usage.
However, as we will show later in the analysis of existing works (see Sect. 5 below),
there is still no perfect solution: the proposed so far authentication protocols are
subjected to security and privacy attacks.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
In this dissertation, we discuss in details privacy and security requirements for
RFID authentication protocols and requirements imposed by technical capabilities
of the technology such as storage, computational, and power resources. We identify
flaws in the existing solutions and propose a secure RFID Authentication protocol
with strong privacy protection. In particular, the contribution of this dissertation
to the field of research is twofold:
1. We have developed an RFID Authentication Protocol that satisfies secu-
rity and privacy requirements commonly considered in the field of RFID
authentication. In particular, through an extensive formal analysis we
have shown that the proposed protocol achieves the following properties:
data anonymity, tag location privacy, backward-untraceability, forward-
untraceability as well as protection against replay and desynchronization
11 GE is the silicon area of a one two-input logical Not-AND gate.
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attacks. Moreover, the protocol uses only lightweight functions in its de-
sign: logical XOR, pseudo-random number generator, and modular squaring.
Thus, the protocol is suitable for implementation on low-cost EPC tags. In
addition, thanks to the Rabin cryptosystem used as a lightweight apparatus
for encryption/decryption, the server requires only O(1) operations to find
the tag ID. The conducted qualitative comparison shows that the proposed
scheme outperforms in security and privacy protection as well as in efficiency
and scalability.
2. Based on the proposed authentication scheme, we have also developed
an ownership transfer protocol. The result of this protocol is that the
ownership will be transferred from the old owner to the new owner. Once
the ownership is transferred, an old owner is neither able to access nor trace
that tag anymore.
The contribution of this dissertation has been published in the following
international conference:
• S. Edelev, S. Taheri, and D. Hogrefe, “A Secure Minimalist RFID Authenti-
cation and an Ownership Transfer Protocol Compliant to EPC C1G2”, in
Proceedings of the 6th IEEE Conference on RFID Technology and Applica-
tions (RFID-TA 2015), Tokyo, Japan, September 2015.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides fundamentals of the RFID technology. In particular, it
describes the main components of RFID – tags and readers, their main physical
characteristics, a communication model, and standards used in different applica-
tions of RFID. This chapter concludes with the summary of the practical benefits
of RFID as an identification technology in contrast to barcodes.
Chapter 3 gives a detailed overview of privacy and security issues in RFID.
We first list the basic security services of information systems. We then identify
the original flaws of the technology that give an opportunity for the attacker to
perform malicious actions. Finally, we investigate the security and privacy threats
of RFID and their influence on business processes and end-users.
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Chapter 4 is dedicated to the requirements for RFID Authentication protocols.
In this chapter, we describe in details an attacker model, define security and
privacy requirements as well as feasibility requirements for EPC C1G2 tags. In the
attacker model, we specify the particular capabilities of an attacker, the queries it
can issue, the attacks it can perform as well as the difference between a strong
and a weak attacker.
Chapter 5 gives a detailed overview of the related works. In particular, we
have investigated four existing authentication protocols that attempted to achieve
security and privacy in RFID using lightweight functions only. For every protocol,
we give a description of the authentication scheme, list security and privacy
properties claimed by authors, show vulnerabilities, and analyze the performance
of the protocols in terms of functions used, amount of computations, and storage
requirements.
Chapter 6 describes the proposed authentication protocol in details. We first
formulate main principles that we use in the design of this protocol. Formulated
principles are the result of the analysis of the existing works and they can be
reused in the design of other RFID authentication protocols. In particular, we
formulate our conclusions about how to achieve protection against various security
and privacy attacks, what influences the protocol complexity, and how to protect
against desynchronization. Second, we describe the core idea and a general
approach followed by the lightweight mathematical apparatus used to perform
encryption and decryption. Third, we explain the specific steps of the proposed
protocol. Forth, we augment the proposed authentication protocol with the
ownership transfer phase. Afterwards, we provide a detailed formal security &
privacy analysis. The chapter ends with the performance analysis and comparison
of the proposed protocol with the existing works in terms of the security and
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2.1 RFID System
RFID systems consist of two essential and two optional components:
1. Tags, or transponders, which store identifiers of the objects.
2. Readers, or transceivers, which query tags, receive, and read data from
them.
3. Databases that associate identification data from tags with business-related
information.
4. Actuators, or external mechanisms, that are managed by the RFID system
and implement the result of the communication session between tags and
readers.
The first two components form a core of every RFID system. Tags are
attached to the objects of identification and contain an identification number of
the object. They transmit the identifiers to readers upon a query through radio
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Figure 2.1: Components of the RFID system and their interactions.
waves. Depending on the setting, readers may work in an offline mode, meaning
that they do not have a connection to the database, and in the online mode, when
there exists a connection to the database. A connection between readers and a
database is considered to be secure (e.g., based on the TLS/SSL protocol).
In the offline mode, readers authenticate tags using either the database from
its local memory or based on the particular features of tags’ IDs. In the online
mode, readers are connected to the authentication server with the database of
valid identifiers and serve as “hops” only, meaning that information processing
and the decision regarding authentication of the tag takes place on the server side.
The result of authentication is later transmitted to the reader, and a separate
signal is sent that indicates the corresponding action, for example, the item is
found in the database, the door opens, the credit card transaction happens, etc.
The scheme of an RFID system is shown on Fig. 2.1.
Weis in his paper [3] describes physical principles and details of RFID compo-
nents. This section summarizes this article as well as other sources: [4, 5, 6, 7].
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2.2 Tags
RFID tags are small electronic devices composed of a microchip connected to
an integrated antenna. The microchip provides storage and in some cases com-
putational capabilities. Antenna provides communicating capabilities with the
reader. Depending on the power source, tags can be passive, semi-passive, or
active. Passive tags use energy emitted from the reader to generate a response,
while active tags are supplied with an internal battery and periodically broadcast
messages containing their IDs. Semi-passive, or battery-assisted, tags are also
provided with a small battery on-board but they respond only upon a request
from the reader, similar to passive tags.
The power source is a primary property of a tag, since it determines a tag’s
potential reading range, lifetime, cost, functionalities, and therefore applications
where tags can be used. The power source also causes what form-factor a tag may
have.
Active tags are the only type of tags that can initiate communication with the
reader. Indeed, active tags constantly beacon their IDs. More advanced active
tags can even communicate with other active tags, thus forming ad-hoc networks.
This can be used, for example, to detect an integrity of shipping containers: if
items within one container are supplied with active RFID tags and one of the
items is suddenly missing, the other surrounding tags could be aware of it, log
this action, and indicate it with an alarm signal. Since active tags have their
own power resource, they operate over longer distances (more than 100m) and
have better computational capabilities than passive tags; however, their lifetime is
limited by the time of the battery, which drains rapidly due to constant beaconing.
Active tags are used for cattle localization over large distances, live tracking of
high-value assets (e.g. medical and electronic equipment, shipment containers),
and others. Active tags are reasonably bigger in size and more expensive than
other types of tags.
Semi-passive tags also contain a power source on-board, but they are not able
to initiate communication with the reader or other tags. Instead, they generate a
response when interrogated by the reader only. In contrast to active tags, it allows
to save power and, thus, to provide a longer lifetime. The presence of an internal
battery, from the one side, allows semi-passive tags to operate on the distances
comparative with that of active tags and provide good computational and storage
characteristics. From the other side, it makes semi-passive tags more expensive
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and bigger in form than passive tags. Since semi-passive tags contain an own
power source, they are often used in connection with the sensing functionality. In
this case, a sensor is incorporated into the tag’s unit or is directly attached to it
with the wire. The sensor takes energy from the tag’s battery and when queried
by the reader the sensor value together with the tag’s ID are sent in response.
Semi-passive tags are also often used in road tollbooth applications. In this case,
the tag is located on the inner side of the car window and works in the slip mode.
Once the car is approaching the tollbooth, the tag is activated and it transmits
information needed for payment (for example, an account number of the driver).
Passive tags are the cheapest and the most common type of RFID tags.
They do not contain any power source; instead, to generate a response they
harvest energy from the incoming electromagnetic signal from the reader. For
this, the reader should be located in the relatively close proximity, which causes a
short-range operating distance (typically 10 cm). Since passive tags are powered
by the external source, they might be fairly considered just as a piece of long-
term memory and, thus, in contrast to the other two types of tags, have almost
unlimited lifetime. The lack of battery also allows flexibility in the design of tags,
making it possible to apply convenient form-factors to passive tags for their better
incorporation into items: from rice-grain-sized RFID chips implanted into pets to
flat, thin, and flexible RFID labels integrated into packing material and paper.
The functionalities of passive tags are limited to the storage of an ID-number
and simple arithmetic operations. Low manufacturing costs of passive tags and
small to no maintenance requirements caused their widespread in the variety
of applications: wireless payments, electronic documents (e-passports), supply
chain management, animal identification, access control systems, theft detection,
and many others. Often passive tags are attached to low-cost consumer items or
packaging material and are meant to be disposed with them.
The comparison of the main characteristics of different types of RFID tags is
summarised in Table 2.1.
Apart from different types of power sources, RFID systems operate at different
radio spectrum. The spectrum defines radio frequencies at which readers and
tags communicate. The radio frequencies, in turn, define the operating distance,
power requirements, performance in terms of signal strength and tolerance to
obstacles of different nature, the physical size of the tag, and finally the areas of
applications. The following five classes of radio bands are used in RFID systems:
1. Low Frequency (LF): 30–300 kHz
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Simple More advanced Most advanced
Maximum operating
range
10 meters >100 meters >100 meters
Relative lifetime Unlimited Less Least
Relative costs Cheapest More expensive Most expensive
Table 2.1: Main characteristics of different types of RFID tags.
2. Medium Frequency (MF): 300 kHz – 3 MHz
3. High Frequency (HF): 3–30 MHz
4. Ultra-High Frequency (UHF): 300 MHz – 3 GHz
5. Microwave: 2,45 GHz & 5,8 GHz
6. Ultra-Wide Band (UWB): 3–30 GHz
In general, the following consequences exist depending on the operating fre-
quency:
1. The higher the frequency, the more energy is required for transmission.
2. With higher frequencies, the signal strength is higher, which makes the
propagation distance longer.
3. Higher frequencies increase the data read rate.
Due to energy requirements, passive tags operate in low, high and ultra-high
frequencies. The longest operating distance may be achieved working on UHF –
up to 12 m, while the reading distance for HF tags is limited by 1 m, and for LF
tags – by 20 cm [8]. Table 2.2 summarizes operating distances, bandwidths, and
application areas by different wavebands.
However, low-frequency tags have better performance in terms of propagation
in proximity to liquids, metal, or dirt. It makes them more appropriate for
complex environments and, thus, they are typically used as implants for animal
identification or as laundry tags. The short reading distance often serves as a
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< 10 kb/s 0,1–0,2 m
Medium Frequency (MF):
300 kHz – 3 MHz
Contactless
Payments
< 50 kb/s 0,2–0,8 m
High Frequency (HF):
3–30 MHz
Access Control < 100 kb/s 0,05–1 m
Ultra-High Frequency (UHF):
300 MHz – 3 GHz





< 200 kb/s ca. 15 m
Table 2.2: Application, bandwidth, and operating distance by wavebands [9].
security advantage when tags are used in automobile immobilizers and access
cards.
High-frequency tags operate on a narrow frequency band and thus may cause
distortions working in sensitive environments with equipment operating on similar
frequencies. This is a typical problem for medical settings. Since HF tags are
often placed into a foil inlay or have a credit card form-factor, they are mainly
used for access control, wireless payments, and asset-tracking applications, for
example, for baggage handling or for books tracking in libraries.
Ultra-high-frequency tags are the cheapest to manufacture and have the
longest reading range among passive tags. It makes them especially popular in
item tracking and supply-chain management applications. However, this type of
tags experiences interference in proximity with metals or liquids, which makes
them infeasible for many applications such as animal tracking, metal container
tracking, or access control systems.
Tags operating on microwave frequencies have a longer reading range and
consume more energy than previously described types. That is why this type
of tags is typically presented by semi-active and active tags. Unfortunately, the
operating frequencies (2,45 GHz and 5,8 GHz) may cause conflicts between RFID
tags and other wireless devices working on IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) and 802.15
(ZigBee) standards.
Ultra-wide band tags do not propagate a signal on a particular frequency, they
rather send low-power signals on a broad band of frequencies. It means that a
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C EPC Read/Write Passive Data Logging
D Sensor Tags Read/Write Semi-Passive Environmental
Sensors
E Motes Read/Write Active Ad Hoc Network-
ing
Table 2.3: Tag functionality classes.
signal on a particular frequency is very weak but an aggregated signal from the
overall range of frequencies is strong and robust. This way of operation allows
avoiding interference with the sensitive equipment and, as a consequence, finds
its application in the medical environment. Moreover, UWB systems have the
longest operating range – up to 200 m and more.
Weis in [3] classifies tags depending on their functionalities into five classes
(see Table 2.3):
The first class of tags are Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS) tags. The
do not contain a unique identification number but they simply announce their
presence to the reader. EAS tags broadcast a single bit of information – ‘Someone
is here’.
EPC (Electronic Product Code) tags contain a unique identification number
of the item. They are used mainly in supply chains and item tracking applications.
EPC tags of class B have a single identifier that is set at the time of manufacture
and cannot be later updated. On the contrary, EPC tags of class C have a
re-writable memory, which allows tags to update their identification numbers or
any other data they carry. EPC tags are typically passive. EPC Class C tags are
the most common type of tags in particular due to their relatively low cost and
sufficient computational and storage characteristics. Their abilities to update an
identifier and to generate random numbers serve as a basis in many authentication
protocols to provide security and privacy properties. We particularly focus on this
class of tags in this work.
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Class D is represented by Sensor Tags. Sensor Tags offer more than only
identification functionality, they possess a sensor board capable of making envi-
ronmental measurements, for example, light, temperature, sound, orientation, and
other measurements. Sensor tags can log information about measurements and
transmit it upon a query from the reader. This class of tags necessary contains
an own power source, thus, these tags are either semi-passive or active.
Class E tags are also called Motes or Smart Dust because they are able to
form ad-hoc networks and communicate with their peers. These tags are more
complex than common EPC tags. Since they are able to initiate communication,
they are presented by active tags.
2.3 Readers
RFID Readers are devices that establish a wireless connection with RFID tags,
query, and identify them. They are the interaction points between tags and the
overall system that collects and analyzes data gathered by readers. Identification
procedure is defined by the authentication protocol used in a particular RFID
environment: it can be a simple request-reply exchange or a multi-round protocol.
Independently on the authentication protocol used, to receive tag’s ID, the reader
broadcasts a message and waits for a reply from the tag. In case several tags
are located in the reader’s vicinity, they all reply simultaneously on the same
frequency and, thus, cause a collision in the communication.
In the environments where multiple tags can be present at the same time,
RFID readers use special anti-collision protocols (for example, ALOHA [10] and
Slotted-ALOHA [11], Binary-tree protocols [12, 13], overview of anti-collision pro-
tocols: [14]). With anti-collision protocols readers can simultaneously communicate
with multiple tags and sequentially identify them.
Readers generate energy to power passive tags. Since passive tags have no
battery, they use energy from the reader to generate a response. Depending
on the protocol, tags can also delegate readers to perform computational and
energy-costly operations.
RFID Readers may be stationary or mobile. Stationary readers are usually
located at the gates of supermarkets or warehouses. Mobile readers are often
produced in a form of a hand-held device or integrated into modern mobile phones.
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Figure 2.2: The communication process in RFID.
2.4 Communication Model and Security of
Communications
The communication in RFID normally starts with the reader’s request to read
data from the tag. The communication link with the request from the reader
to the tag is called a forward channel. The request is sent on the frequency
and in the format defined by the standard used in the particular application (see
Sect. 2.5 for details). Upon receiving the request from the reader, the tag sends its
identification number (ID) in the format defined by the authentication protocol.
The response from the tag back to the reader is sent over the backward channel.
Upon receiving the reply from the tag, the reader processes it and extracts the
tag’s ID. The tag’s ID is later checked in the database with the set of valid IDs,
upon which a decision is made whether the tag is authorized. This communication
process is represented on Fig. 2.2.
The normal operating range of RFID systems depend on various parameters:
a type of tags, sensibility, and power of the reader, the presence of obstacles in the
environment, the nature of the environment, used protocols and standards. Based
on the review from Juels [15], we outline the following read ranges of passive
RFID systems in the increasing order:
1. Nominal read range is specified by the product manufacturer or by the
standard. This is the maximum distance at which a reader conforming
to the standard can reliably read tag data. For example, for contactless
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smart-cards, the respective standard ISO 14443 [16] specifies a nominal
reading range of 10 cm.
2. Rouge scanning rage is the maximum range at which a powerful (rouge)
reader can power and read a tag. This range exceeds the nominal read range
because rouge readers can use much more powerful and sensitive antennas
(or antenna arrays) and thus output power beyond the legal limits. Kfir and
Wool [17] in their work have demonstrated that a battery-powered reading
device can potentially scan ISO 14443 tags at a range of 50 cm, i.e., five
times longer than the nominal range.
3. Tag-to-reader eavesdropping range (backward channel): This is the
range at which the passive rouge reader can eavesdrop the signal sent from
the tag to the valid reader. Since the rouge reader applies its own power to
the existing signal from the valid reader, it increases the reading range in
comparison to the rouge scanning range.
4. Reader-to-Tag eavesdropping range (forward channel): The signal
from the reader to the tag is stronger than the signal back from the tag to
the reader. Therefore, the rouge reader can eavesdrop this channel from
rather far distances. The eavesdropper, who has access to the tag-to-reader
channel, has also access to the reader-to-tag channel, which makes him/her
able to get the full access to the communication between the tag and reader.
5. Detection range: This is the range at which the rouge reader can detect
the presence of the tag or reader. Though the adversary cannot extract useful
information from their communication, the adversary is able to locate an
item. This information can be especially harmful in the military applications.
The model of communications in RFID between tags and readers can be
represented using the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layer model [18]. The
overall interactions in RFID are based on three layers: Physical, Data Link, and
Application ( [6, 19, 20]). Each level is a target for particular attacks. Below we
list the levels of communications in RFID with the description of relative security
issues.
1. Physical Layer. This layer consists of the RFID devices (tags and readers)
and describes the physical air interface between them, in particular, trans-
mission frequency, modulation, data encoding, and data rate. Since tags
are resource-constrained devices due to their cost and size limitations, they
are not able to provide a proper level of the physical security. In particular,
they are vulnerable to tampering, compromise, cloning, and other physical
attacks. One should assume that readers could be compromised as well,
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because they are usually located in the environment with public access. This
layer corresponds to Layer 1 of the model OSI.
2. Data Link Layer. This layer defines the communication interface between
tags and readers in terms of data framing, collision avoidance, error detection
and correction, point-to-point addressing, link control, and commands for
the reading and writing of tags on the low level. The Data Link layer in
RFID deals with the exchange of information in the wireless medium. Thus,
due to the open and insecure nature of the radio links, they become a
prominent target for attacks – the adversary can intercept communications,
modify, or jam the signals. This layer corresponds to Layer 2 of the model
OSI.
3. Application Layer. This layer specifies the organization and structure
of data on tags and readers and describes the flow of the application-
specific RFID authentication protocols. This layer specifies how the data
are analysed and stored. In particular, the protocols on this layer provide
authentication rules applied to tags and readers. Therefore, this layer is sub-
jected to attacks applied to authentication protocols, such as impersonation,
replay, and desynchronization attacks (these attacks are described in more
details in Sect. 3.2). This research concerns and is limited particularly by
the Application Layer. This layer corresponds to Layer 7 of the OSI model.
Layers Three to Six of the OSI Model are not required in RFID because all
links in RFID are point-to-point (without intermediate switches). Therefore, there
is no need for routing or complex transport functions described in Layers Three
and Four of the OSI Model. Functions of establishing communication between
tags and readers as well as functions of data representation (OSI Layers Four and
Five) are implemented on the Data Link Level.
The communication model of RFID is depicted on Fig. 2.3.
2.5 Standardization
In order to insure that tags and readers from different vendors and countries are
compatible with each other and do not interfere with other electronic objects,
standardization is required. In the field of RFID standardization, the major players
are the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [21], International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) [22], and EPCglobal [23].
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Figure 2.3: The communication model in RFID and attacks of each layer.
2.5.1 ISO Standards
To describe briefly, ISO/IEC mainly regulates physical aspects of the technology,
including air interfaces, data protocols, and applications. Various ISO Standards
related to the RFID field and their short descriptions are given in Table 2.4.
Item management in RFID is regulated by the ISO/IEC 18000 standard [24],
with the following parts regarding different frequency ranges:
1. Part 1 – Reference architecture and definition of parameters to be standard-
ized
2. Part 2 – Parameters for air interface communications below 135 kHz (low
frequency)
3. Part 3 – Parameters for air interface communications at 13.56 MHz (high
frequency)
4. Part 4 – Parameters for air interface communications at 2.45 GHz (mi-
crowave)
5. Part 5 – Parameters for air interface communications at 5.8 GHz (microwave),
withdrawn
6. Part 6 – Parameters for air interface communications at 860–960 MHz
(ultra-high frequency)
7. Part 7 – Parameters for active air interface communications at 433 MHz
(ultra-high frequency)
More information can be found in [6] and in the respective standards.
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Standard Targeted Applications
ISO/IEC 11784, 11785, and
14223
Animal Identification





ISO/IEC 69873 Data Carriers for Tools and
Clamping Devices
ISO/IEC 10374 Container Identification
ISO 18185 Electronic seals for tracking
cargo containers
Table 2.4: ISO Standards for RFID and their description.
2.5.2 EPCglobal
The goal of the EPCglobal organisation [23] is to create a network between
trading partners in order to exchange business-related information about consumer
products, if possible, in real time. It allows authorized partners to track goods
through supply chains and get access to previously registered data about products
and their location. The EPCglobal defines standards and procedures regarding
storage and processing capabilities of transponders and readers, data formats,
procedures for discovery, exchange, and security of data. An overview of the
EPCglobal network architecture can be found in [25].
EPCglobal also covers the question of the object name space. In particular,
for the means of the identification, every transponder attached to goods possesses
a globally unique identification number – an Electronic Product Code (EPC).
Depending on the application, the format of the EPC is different and is defined
by the header (the overview of different formats can be found in [26]). The total
length of the identifier can be either 64 bits or 96 bits.
A typical format of the 96-bit EPC tags is depicted on Fig. 2.4. The leading 8
bit is a header that sets an EPC type and defines the length, structure, version,
generation of the whole EPC record. The next 28 bit represent a so called
“EPC Manager”. This field represents a Manufacturer ID or in general an entity
responsible for the product. The first two fields are assigned by the EPCglobal.
The following 24 bit form a field “Object Class”, which contains an ID of the
Product Type, i.e., it identifies a class of objects. The last 36 bit are a Serial
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Figure 2.4: Format of the 96-bit EPC tag.
Number of the particular item – this number uniquely identifies an object. The
last two fields are assigned by the EPC Manager, i.e. the Owner of the object.
Apart from the information about an object, the EPC serves also as a pointer
to database records associated with this product. Database entries provide reach
history of the object’s life cycle, for example, time and location of the object in the
supply chain as well as corresponding operation with the object (transaction). To
perform a search of these data, EPCglobal has developed a public lookup system,
called Object Name Service (ONS), similar to the Domain Name System (DNS)
in the web-domain context. The goal of the ONS is to route queries containing
tags’ IDs to the corresponding database records [15].
EPC tags are small passive tags that can be manufactured in various form-
factors depending on the object to which tags are attached and the type of
application. With the goal to have a minimal price (generally considered no more
than 5 US-cents [2]) and due to the efficiency of their operation, EPC tags are
supposed to replace barcodes in the nearest future.
2.6 Benefits of RFID
Though RFID Systems are more costly in comparison to another popular identifi-
cation technique – barcodes, which are produced by printing only, RFID has still
major advantages and properties that barcodes do not provide [27]:
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1. Unique identification. In contrast to barcodes, which identify a type of
the product only (e.g., “a bar of chocolate, 100 g, brand XYZ”), an RFID
tag emits a unique serial number that specifies a particular item among
millions of identically manufactured objects (e.g. “a bar of chocolate, 100 g,
brand XYZ, SERIAL NO. 123 456 789”) [15].
2. No line-of-sight required. Since technology uses radio waves to transmit
identification information about objects, it does not require direct visibility
of an object. In particular, this property makes it possible to perform
identification in difficult environments when tags are unexpectedly covered
due to weather conditions (with ice, snow, or dirt) or are located inside a
package/container.
3. Simultaneous identification of multiple objects. To prevent collisions
in cases when multiple tags are present in the vicinity of a reader, RFID
systems utilize singulation protocols (such as ALOHA and others, see
Chap. 2.3 for references). The usage of these protocols makes it possible
to perform fast and reliable identification of multiple tags at the same
time. Together with the previous property, it automatizes the identification
processes.
4. Fast response time. RFID tags respond typically in less than 100 mil-
liseconds, which, in particular, makes them appropriate for identification
of movable objects, for example, in the toll payments applications or finish
detection on sport events.
5. Bidirectional communication. In case of RFID, tags and readers are
indeed two communicating parties, where communication is pre-defined by
the particular protocol. The protocol, in turn, allows protecting security and
privacy of transactions. It is opposite to other optical recognition systems,
where a particular identification mark (a barcode, QR-code, etc.) is a piece
of information only without any processing power.
6. Tags can be re-written and can store supplementary information.
On different stages of goods production, shipping, and supply, it is beneficial
for the business purposes to add or modify information stored on tags. In
addition, the ability of tags to update their IDs is the basic property for
privacy protection. In Chap. 5, we will discuss how various protocols use
this property and what level of privacy they achieve.
Due to the ability to recognize objects distantly without being on the line-
of-sight, the field of supply management was influenced greatly by the use of
radio-frequency identification and since long time has been considered as the
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major application area in RFID. As discussed in [28], the usage of RFID reduces
expensive manual operations, increases speed and accuracy of operations, making
the overall distribution process more reliable and cheaper.
Juels et al. in [29] and in [15] in particular point the following benefits of
using RFID tags on the item-level in the retail field:
1. Automatic checkout. Given that all items in the store have an RFID tag
attached, the checkout system could automatically identify all the items in
the customer’s basket and calculate the total price within seconds. Perhaps,
the system could also automatically charge the customer by contacting
his/her RFID-enabled credit card or another payment device with wireless
connectivity.
2. Receiptless item returns and post-purchase benefits. Thanks to
unique identification numbers of RFID tags, the particular item can be
linked with the shop where it was bought and even with the buyer, if he/she
had used a credit card (or other means of identification) at the moment
of purchase. In case the customer wants to return the product or request
the guarantee service, the seller will be able to check that this item was
indeed bought from this shop by looking for a corresponding record of
the purchase in the database. The customer is not required to present a
receipt in this case because the item can be allocated to the shop using its
unique identification number. Current use of barcodes does not allow it
since barcodes represent a type of an item (for example, a bar of chocolate)
but do not identify a particular item (e.g., a bar of chocolate ID: XYZ).
3. Smart appliances. Smart refrigerators could control an expiry date of food
products with RFID tags and create a shopping list when something is over or,
perhaps, make an order in the food delivery service. Washing machines could
analyse RFID-tagged items of apparel to choose an appropriate washing
mode. Microwave ovens could scan RFID tags on the packages of food items
to use appropriate temperature and heating mode.
4. Localisation of lost items. RFID has been shown in the literature as
a way to localise objects in the environment (for example, [30, 31]). This
would allow people to localise lost items, which has a special meaning for
people with memory disabilities. Moreover, the ability of objects to recognise
their location in the environment plays an important role in the field of
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context-aware ubiquitous computing, especially when other localisation
technologies are not available.
5. Recycling. RFID tags embedded in the packaging material of goods could
provide information regarding the type of material and, thus, permit fast
and automatic sorting process for further recycling.
6. Improved customer experience. Modern smartphones support reading
of RFID-labels, which opens perspectives for new applications and improved
customer experience. For example, instead of reading small text from the
packaging, people could read information about the product in a convenient
for them way. Such “Shopping-advisor” App could also notify if the product
contains any ingredients to which the customer is allergic.
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3.1 Authentication and Other Security Proper-
ties
Before explaining the security flaws and requirements for RFID authentication
protocols, in this section, we give definitions for general security properties that
information systems should normally provide [32].
3.1.1 Identification, Authentication, Authorization
Authentication is a security mechanism that provides a proof that the entity is
indeed the one it claims to be. This process takes place after identification of the
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entity and is followed by the authorization. Identification of the entity is made
when the entity gives its name or other identifier. During authorization (often
called as access control), the system checks if the entity wishing to get access to
the particular object has necessary access rights and privileges.
The overall process can be described on the following example. Alice wants
to enter the office Z. She tells the guard Bob her name – by this name Bob can
identify the coming person. Bob asks for the secret phrase that only Alice can
know – if Alice gives the correct phrase, she is authenticated by Bob. Then Bob
checks if Alice has privileges to access the office Z. If she has access rights, she is
authorized to enter the office and Bob lets her in.
Authentication methods can be based on the following three factors [33]:
1. Something you know (Knowledge factor) – this is the most often used
authentication factor. Examples include passwords, pin-codes, and answers
to security questions (like “Where did you meet your partner?”). The
knowledge of this secret information distinguishes one entity from another.
Unfortunately, this factor has several limitations. First, due to human
memory limitations, users tend to use simple passwords, apply the same
password to different systems, or record the password somewhere. Each of
this points lead to the increased vulnerability that the password becomes
known for the attacker. Moreover, attackers can apply techniques of social
engineering to get this secret information from the victim.
2. Something you have (Possession factor) – this authentication factor can be
used to prevent the problem of forgetting secret information in the previous
case. In this case, the authentication can be performed using a security
token, physical key, proximity card, cryptographic calculator, and other
authentication devices. However, once the authentication device is stolen,
the adversary will get illegal access. This is especially dangerous when the
same device (e.g., a smart-card) is used for access to different systems.
3. Something you are (Inherence factor) – this factor includes physical or
behavioral characteristic of the entity, for example, fingerprints of retina,
fingers, hands, voice, or a signature. An example of such property in RFID
is a radio fingerprint of the tag. However, costs, accuracy, and reliability of
these authentication factors are still being discussed.
To improve the security of authentication, information systems tend to use
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two- or multiple-way authentication. For example, it is becoming more common
nowadays to use a pin-code sent by SMS in addition to the password to log-in or
to perform a bank transaction.
3.1.2 Confidentiality
Confidentiality concerns the protection of data from being accessed by unautho-
rized entities. For example, in wireless communications, the typical attack against
confidentiality is eavesdropping. It should also be noted that confidentiality deals
not only with the content of communications but also with the fact that such
communication takes place. In particular, the protective measures should be
considered against traffic analysis, i.e., for the adversary it should be hard to de-
termine the sender, the receiver, the length of the message, and other parameters.
The typical measure to protect data from unauthorized disclosure is encryption.
Encryption can be symmetric when the same key is used by two parties to encrypt
and decrypt the messages and asymmetric when such keys are different.
3.1.3 Anonymity
Anonymity can be represented as a sub-set of the confidentiality. In particular,
the communication can be considered as anonymous when it is not possible for
the unauthorized party to define the sender and the receiver of the message. This
can be achieved when, for example, the identifiers of the sender and the receiver
are updated in the probabilistic manner. Anonymity and confidentiality form a
base for privacy in communications.
3.1.4 Integrity
Integrity of communications guarantees that the message was transmitted from the
sender to the intended receiver without modifications, duplications, reordering, or
errors. This security property deals with active attacks such as man-in-the-middle,
relay, and replay attacks as well as with accidental data transmission errors.
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3.1.5 Availability
Availability refers to the ability of the system to provide resources and services
required by the authorized party. This property relates in general to the ability
of the system to resist attacks against its functionality. Attacks that cause the
system breakdown are called denial-of-service attacks. Availability also relates to
the fair distribution of the resources in wireless networks.
3.1.6 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is the property that provides a proof that the message was indeed
sent or received by the particular entity. In the result, the sender (or the receiver)
cannot claim that it did not send (or did not receive) the message. This property is
especially important in e-commerce or other networks with sensitive information.
3.2 Flaws of RFID
The technology of radio-frequency identification was initially developed to provide
fast and automatic identification of objects. In particular, the aim of RFID is to
establish a mechanism of the communication between readers (transceivers) and
tags (transponders). This mechanism allows readers to query tags and tags – to
respond to the queries with the identification information.
Being fast and simple, the technology, however, possesses vulnerabilities making
it an attractive goal for attackers. Indeed, several original qualities of the RFID
technology bear an opportunity for an adversary to violate security and privacy
in RFID-based communications:
1. Communication between tags and readers is performed through a wireless
channel. Consequently, the open nature of radio communications allows
attackers to eavesdrop communications.
2. Moreover, the RFID technology originally involves no authentication
procedures between the communicating parties.
3. Next, due to the low computational capabilities of tags (given their low costs),
the data transmitted during RFID communications are unencrypted.
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4. Tags are not tamper-proof devices, which allows adversaries to corrupt
tags. In the result, the adversary gets access to the internal information
of the tag, including its ID and secret keys. Moreover, in a number of
applications, it is possible to obtain the current state of a tag even without
corrupting it, because there exists a third party with delegated access to
the tag ID. For example, the initial tag ID is always known to an RFID
integrator, or in the approach proposed for the RFID-enabled banknotes [34],
a merchandiser can update the tag ID.
5. Lastly, tags respond with unique and static IDs.
Adversaries use above-mentioned traits of the RFID technology, which leads
to serious security and privacy attacks. Specifically, the features of RFID give the
following means for adversaries:
1. Eavesdropping. Eavesdropping in RFID communications is defined as
surreptitiously listening and intercepting messages transferred between le-
gitimate RFID entities [35]. An adversary can overhear the transmitted
information between tags and readers, because information in RFID com-
munications is transmitted through the wireless channel, which has an open
and insecure broadcast nature. Though passive RFID tags normally have
a short operating range, the signal broadcasted from the reader is strong
enough to be monitored up to 1000 meters. Moreover, the adversary can use
high-powerful antennas to monitor communications from a large distance.
By eavesdropping, the adversaries are able to follow the execution of the
protocol that may reveal the secret exchange or an update of the tag’s ID.
This information will help the adversary to launch further security and
privacy attacks.
2. Unauthorized tag reading. An adversary can query tags and receive
identifiers in response. This becomes possible, because originally the RFID
technology does not involve any authentication procedures between the
communicating parties. Thus, tags respond automatically to the requests of
every, including malicious, reader.
Consequently, eavesdropping and unauthorized tag reading violate anonymity
and confidentiality of RFID communications. In this sight, researchers (e.g., [15, 35,
36, 37, 38]) raise two major privacy problems in RFID: (1) leakage of information
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about user belongings and (2) tracking the user behaviour. We explain these
concerns in more details. The former concerns data/user privacy, while the latter
concerns location privacy.
3.2.1 Privacy Concerns
Leakage of information about user belongings (violation of
data/user privacy). With the rapid deployment of RFID systems in vari-
ous spheres of the everyday life, people are carrying more and more items that
contain RFID tags inside. It can be quite personal items, the existence of which
the person does not wish to disclose. The examples of such items include expensive
products and accessories, books, or medicines. Once the adversaries are able to
learn the content of the tag, they discover private information about the holder.
For example, the brand of clothes or watches would indicate the material status
of a person; the medicines indicate a particular disease; books reveal political and
personal interests. Indeed, it is possible to associate an identification number
from the EPC tag with a particular class of an object because EPC tags include
a field “Object class” (see Sect. 2.5.2 for more details). Since the allocation rules
are freely available from the EPC standard, this is an easy task. Even if allocation
is done randomly, the adversary can establish a visual contact with the items
in the shop, build a database of the identifiers and corresponding objects, and
discover the patterns for allocation of IDs. This privacy concern is also often
called inventorying.
Tracking the user behavior (violation of location privacy). As was
discussed earlier, in contrast to barcodes, RFID tags emit unique identifiers of
the objects. Therefore, when the adversary is located in the vicinity enough
either to eavesdrop communications between tags and valid readers or to query
tags on his/her own, he/she is able to obtain identifiers of tags. Even if the
identifier does not possess any meaningful data regarding the object, to which
it is attached, the static character of the tag’s replies leads to illegal tracking
of tags and, therefore, to tracking of people and objects that are carrying tags.
More generally, if adversaries located at different places are able to recognize
transactions belonging to the same tag, it violates the location privacy of the tag’s
owner. This concern is motivated by the fact that it is highly possible that people
carry RFID-enabled objects with them on the regular basis. Example of such
objects include RFID-enabled passports (e-passports [39]), contactless credit-cards,
toll payment cards attached to car windshields, or even implanted RFID-tags.
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Froward and backward tracing. Since RFID tags are not tamper-resistant
devices, the current state-of-the-art assumes that attackers can compromise tags,
extract information stored in the tag’s memory, and use it to link the tag with
its previous and future transactions. In particular, the strong adversary with
the ability to compromise a tag is considered in privacy models by Avoine [40],
Vaudenay [41], Juels and Weis [42], and others. Lim and Kwon [1] introduced
the strongest privacy notion of untraceability in RFID, namely, backward- and
forward-untraceability. These notions deal with the case when adversaries are able
to compromise a tag during its life cycle, extract secret data from its memory,
and return the tag to the normal operation. Forward tracing means that the
adversary is able to recognize future transactions of the target tag. Backward
tracing means that the adversary is able to recognize previous transactions of the
target tag. These notions extend the tracking capabilities of the adversaries.
3.2.2 Security Concerns
Impersonation. The security of transactions is mainly vulnerable due to the
ability to execute replay attacks, thus impersonating tags. Security issues are
especially important in access control and payment applications. If the adversary
is able to impersonate a valid tag, then he/she is able to obtain benefits provided
by the valid tag, for example, access to the building or access to the payment
account.
Violation of the integrity of communications. Integrity of communica-
tions is violated typically using man-in-the-middle attacks. In these attacks, the
adversary acts as the intermediate party between the tag and the reader with
the ability to modify and block the transferred information. The possible goals
of this attack are to impersonate a valid reader or a valid tag, to make the tag
traceable for the attacker, or to desynchronize the tags and the server in case the
authentication protocol assumes update of the identifiers.
Desynchronization. The desynchronization attack concerns RFID authen-
tication protocols that involve the update of the tag’s identifier. The approach
to update the tag’s ID is used for privacy protection. However, in order to keep
the correct execution of the further protocol runs, the ID should be updated
properly on both the server and the tag. If the attacker prevents the correct
execution of the protocol that causes the incorrect update of the identifier, the
identification data on the server and on the tag are desynchronized. This makes
32 Chapter 3. Security and Privacy in RFID
the tag unidentifiable for the valid server, which does not allow a tag’s holder
to use his/her benefits (e.g. to pay in the shop). As another consequence, this
attack can make the tag traceable for the attacker.
The complete overview of the attacks and defenses classified based on the
communication levels and security principles are described by Mitrokotsa in [43].
The summary of the attacks on the application level and possible countermeasures
are shown in Table 3.1.
3.2.3 Threats in Supply Chain Environments
Apart from the raw data about the object itself and its location, clandestine
monitoring leads to various further consequences in the supply chain/retailer
environments. Simson et al. [44] give an overview of such threats inside supply
chains grouping them into corporate and personal threats.
3.2.3.1 Corporate Threats
1. Corporate espionage threat. Commercial privacy is subjected to vi-
olation due to clandestine monitoring of goods of the company by the
competitor. For example, the competitor can locate powerful readers near
the warehouse of the company and query the tags attached to the stored
objects. Alternatively, the competitor can query objects being transported.
This will reveal confidential business information about kinds and quantity
of goods stored in warehouses and being transported.
2. Competitive marketing threat. Competitors are able to gather data
about customer’s preferences and use it in their marketing scenarios.
3. Infrastructure threat. RFID, being an infrastructural technology,
strongly influences business processes. Therefore, due to any failure in
the technology, caused either by unexpected events or by illegal competitor’s
actions, this will seriously affect the organizational actions.
4. Trust perimeter threat. Since business networks share data between
each other, Simson et al. raise concerns regarding trust to such sharing
mechanisms.
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match of the creden-







Table 3.1: Possible security and privacy attacks on the application level and
respective countermeasures.
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3.2.3.2 Personal Threats
In addition to the inventorying and tracking threats described earlier, Simson et
al. [44] express the following personal threats:
1. Action threat. Anti-theft detection systems may detect a sudden disap-
pearance of tags attached to the expensive items. This could infer that a
person is going to shoplift, which would activate the alarm. However, this
can also happen if the person accidentally knocks the shelf with items.
2. Transaction threat. Not only can the location of the tag’s owner be
monitored but also transactions with other individuals. This is possible in
particular due to the exchange of items.
3. Breadcrumb threat. Once the person purchases an item in the shop, an
information system builds a link between the item and the person. However,
when the person discards an item, this moment may not be monitored and,
thus, the link in the system will still be kept. The threat arises when the
item is used to commit a crime: in this case, the only identity associated
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As any authentication protocol, RFID authentication protocols should satisfy
the general requirements such as soundness and completeness. Soundness means
that the protocol should authenticate valid entities, while completeness means that
illegal entities should not be authenticated except with the negligible probability.
In addition, RFID authentication protocols should satisfy specific security, privacy,
and technical requirements described below.
4.1 Security and Privacy Requirements
RFID authentication protocols should achieve the following security and privacy
properties [1, 38, 45]:
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4.1.1 Privacy Properties
1. Data privacy (tag anonymity): The protocol should prevent the leakage
of information that allows an adversary to recognize the real identifier of the
tag. This makes an adversary unable to learn what object of identification is.
If disclosed, the data about user’s belongings can reveal sensitive information
such as user’s interests, social status, political attitude, and others.
2. Tag location privacy: The protocol should ensure that located at different
places adversaries are not able to recognize transactions belonging to the
same tag. Otherwise, this is the way to trace the tag and, therefore, its owner.
Violation of the location privacy leads to the disclosure of the social activities
of the private person and confidential business information. To achieve this
as well as the previous property, there should be no computational link
between tag’s replies (the formal definitions are described below in Sect. 6.8)
3. Backward- and forward-untraceability [1]: The protocol should ensure
that, if the tag was compromised and the information from its memory
became known to the attacker, the attacker still cannot trace previous
and future transactions of the tag. These notions deal with the case when
the adversary corrupts the tag Ti and reveals its internal state at time t.
Backward-untraceability means that the adversary cannot determine if a
transaction at time t’<t involves the tag Ti. Forward-untraceability means
that the adversary cannot determine if a transaction at time t’>t involves the
tag Ti. Lim and Kwon [1] proved that forward-untraceability is achievable
only if the adversary misses at least one successful transaction between the
tag Ti and the valid server/reader at time t” such that: t<t”<t’. To achieve
this property, tag’s previous and future replies should not depend on the
currently stored on the tag data.
4. Ownership transfer [46]: Ownership is defined from the one side by the
ability of the owner to interact with the tag, modify it, and transfer the
ownership, and by the ability of the tag to be authenticated by its owner
from the other side. In its life cycle, a tag may change its owners, for
example, in supply chains when goods are moved between different parties
or when one buys an object or receives it as a present. Thus, in secure
protocols, an old owner must have no means of accessing the tag and tracing
it after the ownership has been transferred.
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4.1.2 Security Properties
1. Replay attacks: The protocol should assume that the communication
channel between tags and readers is insecure and can be eavesdropped.
Therefore, the protocol should ensure that the messages transmitted during
the authentication protocol cannot be reused (=replayed) by the adversary
to impersonate any of the communicating parties. To protect against replay
attacks, protocol messages should contain the freshly generated nonce.
2. Tag Impersonation attacks: An adversary should not be able to generate
the correct response of the tag without knowing the tag’s internal secrets.
3. Desynchronization attacks: Desynchronization attacks can be launched
against the protocols that update the tag ID after every transaction. Com-
mon ways to perform desynchronization attacks are: (1) to query the tag in
order to cause an update of its ID so many times that it cannot be identified
on the server side, (2) to block/modify messages in the protocol run (i.e.,
to cause an incorrect execution of the protocol), or (3) to impersonate the
reader/server.
4.2 Technical Requirements for Low-cost EPC
Tags
Apart from the above security and privacy requirements, in order to be applied
to the real-world RFID systems, the protocols should satisfy the feasibility re-
quirements. EPC Class-1 Genereation-2 (EPC C1G2) has become an industrial
standard for low cost tags with limited storage and computational capabilities.
It limits the use of cryptographic primitives to 16-bit cyclic redundancy checks
(CRCs) and 16-bit pseudo random number generators (PRNGs) only [47]. More
details about the EPC C1G2 standard and related implementation challenges can
be found in Picazo-Sanchez et al. [48]. It is also commonly considered that simple
tags have at most 2000 Gate Equivalents (GE) for security purposes [2]. This is
certainly not enough for the classical implementations of the public-key cryptog-
raphy (e.g., RSA) or hash functions (e.g., SHA-1, MD-5) on tags. In addition, the
protocol construction should have only one round of the “request-reply” message
exchange between tags and readers (i.e., one “request”-message from the reader
and one “reply”-message from the tag).
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To be precise, it is commonly considered that lightweight protocols should
target low-cost tags in the range of 0,05-0,1 USD production price [2]. This cost
limitation influences on the physical capabilities of tags in terms of computational
power and storage. Consequently, the design of the lightweight authentication pro-
tocol has become a crucial subject among researcher in the last years. Armknecht
et al. [49] gathered the set of technical conditions to be met.
1. Timing: The whole communication process should take no longer than 150
msec.
2. Operating Frequency and Transmission Bandwidth: The operating
frequency depends on the application and varies from Low Frequency (LF),
30-300 kHz to Super-High Frequency (SHF), 3-30 GHz (see Table 2.2). The
higher the waveband, the higher the bandwidth. The largest transmission
bandwidth is limited to 200 kbit/s, while 100 kbit/s is the limit for one of
the most popular applications – access control. Taking the limit for the
duration of the authentication process, this implies that 30,000 bit is the
maximum transmission size of the whole transaction.
3. Chip Area: Juels and Weis in [2] have determined the upper bound for the
chip area as 2000 Gate Equivalents (GE) for security purposes and 10000 GE
for the overall gate budget (where 1GE is the silicon area of a one two-input
logical Not-AND gate). This number was later confirmed by Armknecht et
al. [49] in the result of discussions with industrial experts. Existing works on
designing the light-weight cryptographic functions (such as pseudo-random
number generators, hash functions, symmetric cryptography) for low-cost
RFID tags also target this limit (e.g. [50, 51, 52, 53]).
4. Power: Since passive RFID tags use the power emitted by the reader, it
strongly limits the amount of power required for operations on tags. The
maximum amount of power allowed to be generated by the reader is specified
in the respective communication standard used in the particular application.
For example, the EPC Gen 2 regulations define a power limit in 2W EIRP
(Equivalent isotropically radiated power) in Germany and 4W EIRP in the
USA [54]. The power consumed by the tag influences the maximum reading
distance – the more power it requires, the less is the operating distance. In
addition, Juels and Weis [2] define the general upper bound of 10 µW.
5. Clock Speed and Clock Cycles. The upper bound of the amount of
clock cycles for computations on tags is defined by the time limit of the
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transaction time and by the clock speed. The clock speed, in turn, is limited
by the power consumption limits. The higher the clock speed, the more
clock cycles can be performed within the same time interval. However,
the more the clock speed, the more the power consumption. Therefore,
researchers and industry experts consider 100 kHz as the prevalent clock
speed feasible on constrained RFID tags. Assuming an upper bound of 150
msec for executing a full authentication instance, a clock speed of 100 kHz
gives a limit of 15,000 clock cycles for tags to perform all the necessary
computations during the authentication.
6. Memory: Juels and Weis [2] have stated that 128-512 bits are available for
the read-only-storage and 32-128 bits are available for the volatile read-write
memory on low-cost RFID tags.
4.3 Attacker Model
For the attacker model, we reuse the definition of the powerful adversary from
the Vaudenay model [41]. In addition, the attacker is based on the Dolev-Yao
intruder model [55]. We assume that the powerful adversary can:
1. monitor all communications between tags and readers,
2. store the eavesdropped transactions in an unlimited manner,
3. modify and block messages,
4. inject his own messages making them look like they were sent by the tag or
reader,
5. query tags and readers,
6. corrupt tags,
7. and get side channel information about the result of the tag’s authentication
(i.e. observe the result of the authentication).
This adversary model also satisfies the formal models proposed by Avoine [40]
and Juels and Weis [42].
The adversary who monitors communications is called an eavesdropper ; the
adversary who queries valid tags is called a malicious reader ; the adversary who
queries valid readers/servers is called a malicious tag. The adversary can use the
collected information in order to trace tags. Malicious readers are considered more
powerful than valid readers and, therefore, can operate over larger distances [56].
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For the simplicity of further explanations, we follow the style of the formal
definitions from [57, 58]. The adversary A is formally defined by the ability to
issue the following queries:
Execute (S, T, i): This query represents passive attacks, where an adversary
A eavesdrops the honest session i between the tag T and the server S.
SendTag (T, i, m) → m’ : This query sends a message m to the tag T in
the protocol session i and receives the tag’s response m’.
Modify (m, i, m’): With this query, A modifies the message m in the
protocol session i to the message m’. If m’ is Null, the message m is
considered blocked by A.
Corrupt (T) → Data: With this query, A compromises the tag T and
retrieves the data from T ’s internal memory (e.g., T ’s ID, a secret key,
an internal state of PRNG). The query captures strong privacy notions of
backward-untraceability or forward-untraceability depending on the time
when this query is called.
Definition 1 (Attacks). We define six type of attacks as follows:
Anonymity attack: The adversary plays as a malicious reader and eaves-
dropper who attempts to discover the tag (tag’s ID) that is communicating
with the valid server or with the adversary. The adversary cannot corrupt
the tag in this attack.
Location privacy attack: This attack captures the notion of the tag
traceability. With this attack, the adversary attempts to link the particular
responses in different sessions with the particular tag. The adversary cannot
corrupt the tag in this attack.
Impersonation attack: The adversary plays as a malicious reader or as
a malicious tag who attempts to successfully authenticate itself as a valid
reader or as a valid tag, respectively. The adversary cannot use corrupt
query in this attack.
Desynchronization attack: With this attack, the adversary attempts to
make the tag unidentifiable for the valid server in the future transactions
by mismatching the records of the tag’s ID on the server’s and on the tag’s
sides.
Backward attack: The adversary plays as a malicious reader and eaves-
dropper who attempts to trace the tag’s previous communications.
Forward attack: The adversary plays as a malicious reader and eavesdrop-
per who attempts to trace the tag’s future communications.
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The review of the related works showed us that not every work clearly says
whether their attacker model assumes message blocking/modification by the active
adversary, which makes it difficult to fully analyse the properties achieved by the
protocol. We explicitly state that the attacker in our model can modify and block
messages during the protocol session between the protocol parties.
Note: we do not consider server impersonation attacks because the tag does
not authenticate the server in the proposed protocol.
Definition 2 (Strong and weak adversaries). A strong adversary can
access all the above queries and launch all the above attacks, while a weak adversary
cannot access the Corrupt (T) query.
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To achieve privacy and security in RFID-based systems, numerous RFID au-
thentication protocols have been recently proposed and analysed. Piramuthu [59]
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Symbol Description
T Tag
S Server⊕, XOR Exclusive-Or operator
 Right-bit shift operator
← Assignment operator
‖ Concatenation operator
Table 5.1: Used notations in the description of related works.
has made an extensive survey of the different approaches used to design RFID
authentication protocols and identified privacy flaws and security vulnerabilities in
all of the discussed schemes. We refer the reader to this work for more details. In
addition to security and privacy vulnerabilities, most of the schemes use complex
computations (e.g., hash functions, encryption and decryption functions) that do
not conform to the EPC C1G2 standard and, therefore, cannot be implemented
on low-cost tags.
In this section, we will describe several existing works that attempted to achieve
security and privacy in RFID using lightweight functions only. In other words,
we have considered the studies that aimed at not only achieving security and
privacy properties in RFID authentication protocols but also at making the solution
practical for implementation on simple passive low-cost RFID tags. We review each
protocol, describe the claimed properties, and analyse vulnerabilities. Although
numerous protocols have been developed for the lightweight authentication in
RFID, we will review the following four works: Jin et al. [60], Le et al. [61], Lee et
al. [62], and Doss et al. [63]. While describing the protocols we will highlight only
those parameters and steps that are important for authentication. We use the
notations from Table 5.1. The functions and parameters specific for each scheme
are described in the respective section.
In the following sections, we first provide a description of the scheme including
the properties claimed by the authors, after which we show its vulnerabilities,
and finally we make a performance analysis in terms of functions used, amount of
computations, and storage requirements.
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5.1 Jin et al., 2011
5.1.1 Description
Jin et al. [60] proposed a lightweight RFID authentication protocol that uses a
PRNG, XOR function, right-bit shift operator, and a lightweight encryption based
on the SQUASH scheme [64]. The SQUASH scheme is an implementation of the
Rabin scheme [65] for RFID tags based on the Quadratic residues property (see
Sect. 6.5 for more details about the Rabin scheme).
In this protocol, every tag Ti is assigned an identifier ti. The set of tags’
identifiers is stored in the database on the server side. The server also stores the
previously known ID of each tag si. Tags and the server share a big integer n,
which is a product of two large primes.
The authentication scheme works on the following algorithm (Fig. 5.1):
1. The tag generates a random number rT and calculates the following expres-
sions:
M = ti XOR rT
N’ = rT 2 mod n
N = [N’]t, where t is a length of the substring N’ assigned to N.
2. The tag transmits M and N to the server
3. The server makes an exhaustive search and looks for such ti that
[N’]t = N, where
N’ = (M XOR ti)2 mod n
4. The server updates the new and the old tag’s identifiers:
si’ = ti
ti = (si’)2 mod n
si = ti
5. The server calculates
rT = M XOR ti,
P = si XOR (rT  l/2), where l is the length of ti,
and sends rT and P.
6. The tag calculates si (its previous ID) from received P:
si = P XOR (rT  l/2)
and checks
if ti = si2 mod n then
ti ← ti2 mod n .
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Figure 5.1: The protocol by Jin et al. [60].
To protect against desynchronization, the authors propose to store the old
(unupdated) identifiers of tags on the server and check them as well during the
authentication phase.
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5.1.2 Claimed Properties
Jin et al. have claimed that their scheme satisfies the following properties:
1. Resistance against Replay Attacks,
2. Resistance against Desynchronization Attacks,




Vulnerability to Replay attacks
The design of the protocol assumes that the identification message of the tag
is based on the following values:
• Tag’s ID ti ;
• a random number generated by the tag rT ;
• a shared parameter n.
The authors’ statement about the protection against replay attacks is based on
the assumption that the tag’s ID will be updated at the end of the transactions,
which means that it will not be valid anymore. However, in the situations when the
message from the tag is not transmitted (due to transmission errors or malicious
behaviour of the attacker), the identification message can be reused. The reason
for this flaw is that the tag’s reply does not contain the randomness generated by
the server. The replayed message will be identified as valid by the server because
the server also stores old (unupdated) identifiers of tags and checks them as well
during the authentication phase. This is in particular a result of the protection
against desynchronization attacks.
Vulnerability to Desynchronization
As can be seen from the protocol design, on the last step, the tag authenticates
the reader. Only if the reader is authenticated, the tag updates its ID. However,
Sohrabi-Bonab et al. [66] showed a Server Impersonation Attack on this protocol
that causes authentication of the malicious attacker as a server. As a result, the
tag will consider the attacker’s response as correct and will update its ID. This,
in turn, will cause desynchronization between the tag and the valid server.
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Vulnerability to Traceability attacks
Moreover, it was shown in Sohrabi-Bonab et al. [66] that the tags become
traceable when the session is not complete (i.e., when the message from the valid
server is not received by the tag). In particular, they have shown that in case of









, where index i shows the session num-
ber.
Forward-traceable
The Tag’s ID is updated by the modular squaring of the current ID:
ti ← ti2 mod n
It allows the attacker to restore the current ID of the tag on the x-th transaction
after the tag had been compromised even if the attacker missed one transaction
in the meanwhile.
In other words, let us denote t0 as the tag’s ID stored in its memory. t0
is known to the attacker at the moment when the tag was compromised. The
attacker puts the tag back to the normal operation and misses one transaction,
where t0 is updated to t1.
The attacker eavesdrops the second transaction, where the tag sends
M = t1 XOR rT , and N = rT 2 mod n, where t1 was derived as t1 = t02 mod n .
The attacker computes:
t1 = t02 mod n
N’ = (M XOR ti)2 mod n
If [N’]t = N, the attacker concludes that the observed transaction occurs with
the previously compromised tag. Consequently, the protocol is forward-traceable.
5.1.4 Performance Analysis
Tag side
The following computational functions are called on the tag side:
1. PRNG – 1 call
2. XOR – 2 calls
3. Modular squaring – 3 calls
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4. Right bit-shift – 1 call
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: 2L bit, where L is the maximum size of integer n (in
bits).
2. Volatile memory: 5L bit.
Server side
The following computational functions are called on the server side:
1. XOR – 2 calls
2. Modular squaring – 2 calls
3. Right bit-shift – 1 call
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: 4L ·N + L , where N is the number of tags in the
system.
2. Volatile memory: 7L
Database look-up complexity in the worst case: O(N). The protocol consists of
three communication flows.
5.2 Le et al., 2007
Le et al. [61] proposed two lightweight protocols O-FRAP and O-FRAKE that use
a pseudo-random function only for computations on tags and readers. O-FRAKE
is an extension of O-FRAP and both of them possess the same security properties.
That is why for the simplicity, we will describe O-FRAP in the following section.
The discussion given is also valid for O-FRAKE.
5.2.1 Description
In the O-FRAP (Optimistic Forward-secure RFID Authentication Protocol), the
tags and the server share a key-pair {ri, Ki}. This pair uniquely identifies a tag
in the system. The protocol executes in the following way (Fig. 5.2):
1. The server generates a random number r and sends it to the tag.
2. The tag calculates:
v1 ‖ v2 ‖ v3 ‖ v4 ‖ v5 = F (Ki, r ‖ ri), where ‖ is a concatenation operator,
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Figure 5.2: O-FRAP protocol by Le et al. [61].
F() is a pseudo-random function.
3. The tag sends ri and v2 to the server and updates ri:
ri ← v1
4. The server makes an exhaustive search in the database and for every pair
{ri, Ki}, it calculates:
v1′ ‖ v2′ ‖ v3′ ‖ v4′ ‖ v5′ = F (Ki, r ‖ ri)
5. The server checks: If v2’=v2, then the tag is identified and authenticated.
6. The server updates ri and Ki:
(ri, Ki) ← (v1’, v4’)
and sends v3’ to the tag.
7. The tag checks: if v3’=v3 then it updates:
Ki ← v4
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5.2.2 Claimed Properties






The protocols by Le et al. [61] indeed provide anonymity because the information
associated with the tag ID (ri, Ki) is never transmitted in the clear text. In
addition, since ri is updated in the random manner after every query, the messages
ri and v2 transmitted from the tag to the server have no computational link with
the messages transmitted in previous and future transactions until the secret Ki
is known. However, the protocol is vulnerable to desynchronization attacks and is
backward-traceable.
Vulnerable to Desynchronization attacks
Unfortunately, the protocol by design is vulnerable to simple desynchronization
attacks. If a malicious reader queries the tag, the tag updates the value ri. This
value is used to identify the tag to the valid reader. The unauthorised queries
by attackers cause the update of ri on the tag’s side, while this value will not be
updated on the server side. As the result, the tag will not be authenticated by
the valid server during the next transaction. This attack is shown in details by
Ouafi and Phan [67].
Backward-traceable
To demonstrate that the protocol is backward-traceable, we present the fol-
lowing attack:
Learning: The adversary queries the tag Ti by sending an arbitrary random
number r and stops the execution of the protocol once the tag’s response
is received. Thus, the adversary receives r̃i and ṽ2. The adversary queries
other tags as well.
Challenge: The adversary is given a tag T0. Adversary compromises T0
and extracts a secret K0. The adversary calculates:
v1 ‖ v2 ‖ v3 ‖ v4 ‖ v5 = F (K0, r ‖ r̃i).
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Guess: If v2 = ṽ2, the adversary concludes that the compromised tag T0
is the eavesdropped tag Ti. Therefore, the protocol is backward-traceable.
Forward-untraceable
Interestingly, this protocol is forward-untraceable because the tag will update
its secrets ri, Ki when the adversary misses at least one transaction after the
tag was compromised. The nature of such an update is random and depends on
the random number sent by the valid server in the request message. Therefore,
for the adversary it is not possible to restore the current secrets of the tag




The following computational functions are called on the tag side:
1. PRNG – 1 call
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: 2L bit, where L is the maximum size of a tag’s key
(in bits).
2. Volatile memory: 6L bit.
Server side
The following computational functions are called on the server side:
1. PRNG – 1 call
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: 2L ·N , where N is the number of tags in the system.
2. Volatile memory: 7L
Database look-up complexity in the worst case: O(N). The protocol consists of
three communication flows.
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5.3 Lee et al., 2009
Lee et al. [62] presented an Ultralightweight RFID Protocol with Mutual Authen-
tication that uses the following lightweight functions: XOR, AND, OR, and bit
rotation Rot (A, B)1. The random number generator is used by the server only.
Similar to the previously described protocols, this protocol consists of two phases:
authentication and key updating.
5.3.1 Description
Every tag Ti shares its dynamic temporary identifier IDTi and a secret key Ki
with the server S. The protocol executes in the following way (Fig. 5.3):
1. The server sends a request to the tag.
2. The tag immediately replies with its identifier IDTi.
3. Based on the IDTi received, the server finds a corresponding Ki in the
database.




Ki = Rot(Ki, Ki)




5. The server transmits A and B to the tag.
6. The tag derives Ni from A: Ni = A
⊕
Ki
7. The tag calculates Ki, Ni, and B in the same way and compares the
calculated value B with the received B from the server. On this step, the
tag authenticates the sever:
Ki = Rot(Ki, Ki)












and transmits C to the server.
9. The tag updates IDTi and Ki:
1Rot(A, B) denotes to left rotate the value of A with n bits, where n is the number of “1” in
B
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Figure 5.3: The protocol by Lee et al. [62].
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On this step, the server authenticates the tag.
11. Once the tag is authenticated, the server updates IDTi and Ki in the
database (in the same fashion as on step 9).







Lee at al. in the analysis of the proposed protocol have claimed the following
security and privacy properties:
1. Anonymity,
2. Resistance against Impersonation attacks,
3. Resistance against Replay attacks,
4. Resistance against Desynchronization attacks,
5. Backward-untraceability.
5.3.3 Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability to Replay and (Backward-)Traceability attacks
The main drawback of this protocol is that the tag replies with a static
response if the previous transaction occurred unsuccessfully, i.e., if during the last
transaction a tag could not authenticate a server. This is the case when (1) the
tag was queried by a malicious reader or (2) when the messages from the server
to the tag (A and B) were transmitted with errors (transmission errors or due to
the malicious actions of the adversary). This makes the protocol vulnerable to
replay and traceability (including Backward-traceability) attacks.
Vulnerability to Desynchronization attacks and loss of anonymity
Furthermore, the blocking of the last message from the valid tag to the server
desynchronizes the tag’s ID between the tag and the server. In addition to these
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attacks, Peris-Lopez et al. [68] conducted a detailed analysis of this scheme and
found out that the protocol does not provide anonymity. They have shown how
the protocol design makes it possible for the adversary to disclose the secret key
Ki of the tag by eavesdropping several transactions.
Forward-untraceable
As shown by Lim and Kwon [1], when analysing forward-untraceability attacks,
one should assume that at least one complete and valid transaction happens
between the tag and the valid server after the tag had been compromised. In the
case of the protocol by Lee et al., the tag’s secrets are updated using the random
number generated by the server. As per our analysis, for the adversary it is
impossible to link the compromised parameters IDTi and Ki with the messages A,
B, and C eavesdropped after at least one complete unheard transaction. Therefore,
the protocol by Lee et al. is forward untraceable.
Consequently, in contrast to the claimed statements by the authors, the
proposed protocol is vulnerable to Impersonation, Desynchronization, Replay
attacks, is traceable, and is not anonymous.
5.3.4 Performance Analysis
Tag side
The following computational functions are called on the tag side:
1. XOR – 5 calls
2. Bit rotation – 2 calls
3. 1 AND, 1 OR
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: 2L bit, where L is the maximum size of a tag’s key
(in bits).
2. Volatile memory: 7L bit.
Server side
The following computational functions are called on the server side:
1. PRNG – 1 call
2. XOR – 5 calls
3. Bit rotation – 2 calls
4. 1 AND, 1 OR
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Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: 2L ·N , where N is the number of tags in the system.
2. Volatile memory: 8L
Database look-up complexity in the worst case: O(1). The protocol consists of
four communication flows.
5.4 Doss et al., 2012
Doss et al. in [63] proposed “A minimum disclosure approach to authentication
and privacy in RFID systems” (MDA protocol for short). The protocol aims
to be suitable for low-cost EPC tags with the small computational power. For
this purpose, the MDA protocol uses PRNG, XOR, and Quadratic residues as
cryptographic primitives to provide mutual authentication.
5.4.1 Description
This protocol uses a minimal disclosure property to authenticate the tag. This
approach is similar to the “zero-knowledge authentication” paradigm, where
the prover proves that it knows a secret but the secret itself is not revealed to
the verifier. We describe the minimal disclosure property below based on the
description from [63].
5.4.1.1 Minimal Disclosure Property
Let n be a product of two large prime numbers g and q. We assume that A has a
secret V represented by a sequence of numbers {v1, v2, v3, . . . , vm},where 1≤vj<n.
A wants to convince the verifier B that it has a secret V. For that, A shares with B
a sequence of integers {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sm}, where sj ≡ v−2j mod n, 1≤sj<n. A ge-
nerates a random number r and computes x ≡ r2 mod n and y ≡ r∏j∈S vj(mod n),
0≤y<n, where S is a subset of the set {1, 2, . . . , m}. With the knowledge of
x and y, B can verify that x ≡ y2z mod n, where z ≡ ∏j∈S sj (mod n), 0≤z<n.
This congruence holds because: y2z ≡ r2∏j∈S v2j ∏j∈S sj ≡ r2 (mod n) [69].
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5.4.1.2 Protocol Description
The MDA protocol has two phases: initialization and authentication (see Fig.
5.4).
Initialization
In the initialization phase, the server generates two large primes p and q and
computes n = g ∗ q. Each tag is assigned an identification number TID and a
secret KT ID= v1‖v2‖v3‖. . . ‖vm. The server generates a random number r and
computes the following values:
sj ≡ v−2j mod n
RT ID = h(TID)
⊕
r
R−1T ID = h (TID)
⊕
r−1, where r−1 is the previous value of r (initially r=r−1),
h() is a hash-function.
Each tag is initialised with the following record:
{TID, h(TID), KT ID, n, r}.
For each tag in the system, the server stores a record with the following
parameters:
{RT ID, R−1T ID, TID, h(TID), KT ID, r, r−1}.
Authentication
1. The authentication phase starts with the query from the server to the tag
supplied with a random number s.
2. The tag generates a random number rt and calculates:
M = TID ⊕ rt⊕ s
x = M2 mod n
c = x⊕h(TID) ‖ s⊕ r





where vp is chosen at random from KT ID,
y = (M · vp · vp+1 · · · vp+l) mod n, where l = m− p.
3. The tag sends c, y, Rt, p to the server.
4. Based on received Rt and p, the server searchers RT ID or R−1T ID such that:
Rt ⊕ vp = RT ID or R−1T ID
5. Based on the found RT ID, the server retrieves corresponding TID, h(TID),
KT ID, r.
Note: for the equation above, R−1T ID is used in case the previous transaction
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Figure 5.4: The MDA Protocol by Doss et al. [63].
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had been incomplete and the tag had not updated r (see below). If Rt⊕vp =
R−1T ID, then r−1 is used in the calculations below instead of r.
6. The server calculates:
x = c⊕h (TID) ‖ s⊕ r
and verifies: if y2z = x mod n, where z = ∏p+lj=p sj mod n, then the tag is
authenticated (otherwise, the protocol is aborted).
7. If Rt ⊕ vp = RT ID, the server updates:
r−1 ← r
r ← PRNG (r)
8. The server applies Chinese Reminder Theorem with the knowledge of p and
q to find M as a Quadratic residue of x modulo n. There are four possible
solutions Mi, 0<i≤4. The server forwards each of these solutions in the
response ACKi:
ACKi = CRC (Mi
⊕
h (TID)), where CRC() is a Cyclic Redundancy
Check.
9. The tag checks if ACKi = CRC (M
⊕
h (TID)), then it updates r :
r ← PRNG(r)
5.4.2 Claimed Properties
Doss et al. have analysed the proposed protocol and have claimed the following
properties of their scheme:
1. Tag anonymity,
2. Tag location privacy,
3. Backward-untraceability,
4. Protection against Replay attacks,
5. Protection against Desynchronization attacks.
5.4.3 Vulnerability Analysis
Traceability attacks
Sohrabi-Bonab et al. [66] showed that traceability of the MDA protocol is
possible based on two facts: (1) the parameter r remains unchanged when the
transaction is incomplete (meaning that the tag does not receive ACKi from the
server or if ACKi is not valid) and (2) the insignificant size of the tag’s secret
KT ID due to the memory limitations of EPC tags. Though the tag transmits
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only a random part of KT ID in Rt, it was proved in [66] that given m=16 for the
adversary it is sufficient to query the tag only 5 times in order to be able to link
the tag with the previously recorded responses with the probability of 66% (i.e.
16% advantage over the random guess).
Backward-traceability
To demonstrate that the protocol is backward-traceable, we present the fol-
lowing attack:
Learning: The adversary queries the tag T0 and receives in response c0,
y0, Rt0, p0.
Challenge: The adversary is randomly given a tag Tb, where b={0; 1}.
The adversary compromises Tb and extracts h(TID), KT ID, and r.
Guess: Based on Rt0 and p0, the adversary verifies:




r then b=0, otherwise b=1.
Therefore, the MDA protocol is backward-traceable.
Forward-traceability
To show that the protocol is forward-traceable, we provide the following attack:
Learning: The adversary compromises the tag T0 and extracts all informa-
tion from its memory, in particular, h(TID)0, KT ID0, r0, and a state of the
PRNG.
Challenge: The adversary returns the tag T0 to its normal operation and
misses one transaction between T0 and a valid server. Afterwards, the
adversary queries a tag Tb or eavesdrops a transaction between Tb and a
valid server. Consequently, the adversary gets messages Rtb and pb.
Guess: The adversary calculates r=PRNG (r0) and verifies: if
h (TID)0⊕ vpb ⊕ r = Rbt , then b=0, i.e., the eavesdropped transaction
belongs to the previously compromised tag.
Therefore, the MDA protocol is forward-traceable.
5.4.4 Performance Analysis
Tag side
The following computational functions are called on the tag side:
1. PRNG – 2 calls
2. XOR – 7-10 calls
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3. Cyclic redundancy check – 1-4 call(s)
4. Modular squaring – 1 call
5. Modular multiplication – (l+1 ) calls, where l – is a parameter in the protocol
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: (1L + 4M) bit, where L is the maximum size of a
tag’s ID, M is the maximum size of the integer n (in bits).
2. Volatile memory: (3L+ 5M) bit.
Server side
The following computational functions are called on the server side:
1. PRNG – 2 calls
2. XOR – 4-7 calls
3. Cyclic redundancy check – 1-4 call(s)
4. Modular squaring – 1 call
5. Modular multiplication – (l+1) calls
6. Solve quadratic residues – 1 call
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: (1L+ 6M) ·N + 3M , where N is the number of tags
in the system.
2. Volatile memory: 7M+L
Database look-up complexity in the worst case: O(N). The protocol consists of
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6.1 System Model
In this section, we describe the entities of the RFID system that take part in the
authentication protocols in RFID. As shown earlier in Chap. 2, the RFID system
is composed of Tags, Readers, and a Server:
Tag Ti: An RFID tag is a small device composed of a microchip connected
to an integrated antenna. It stores a unique identifier (ID) of the object to which
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it is attached. Identification data of the tag are transmitted through radio waves
to an RFID reader, hence the tag and the reader do not necessarily have to be on
the line of sight. Tags have little storage and computational capabilities and are
not temper-resistant. We consider passive EPC (Electronic Product Code) tags.
The example specification regarding the EPC tags can be found in Sect. 4.2.
Reader Ri: RFID readers are devices that serve as the interaction points
between tags and an authentication server. They establish a wireless connection
with RFID tags, query them, receive a reply, and transmit the reply to the
server. A separate protocol is established between the readers and sever that
authorizes readers to communicate with the authentication server. We assume
that communication channels between tags and readers and between readers and
the server are not secure and can be eavesdropped and manipulated.
Server S: The server adds/removes tags to/from the system and manages
a database with the identification information about the tags. It collects and
analyzes data gathered by readers, and authenticates the tags depending on the
authentication protocol used in a particular RFID environment.
Since Readers work as “hops” only, transmitting the information from tags
to the server and back, we define that a protocol party is a Ti ∈ Tags or S ∈
Server, where 0<i<n, and n – is the number of tags in the system. The protocol
parties interact in the polynomial-time protocol according to the algorithm below.
Each party is a probabilistic interactive Turing machine with a sufficient internal
storage.
The model of communications between these entities is described in Sect. 2.4.
6.2 Motivation & Overview
During the rigorous review of the existing RFID authentication protocols, we
looked at the gist of each protocol to understand what exactly provides protection
against particular attacks and why the protocols were later shown vulnerable
to other security and privacy attacks. We have also noted that a majority of
the protocols do not consider restricted storage and computational capabilities
of tags as well as the scalability properties in terms of computational costs and
the complexity for the database look-up. With this work, we aim to design a
minimalist protocol that, from the one side, achieves the set of security and
privacy requirements under the common attacker model and, from the other side,
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is efficient, scalable, and feasible for implementation on simple low-cost tags. We
believe that complex protocols are incompatible with simple tags.
In particular, we have come to the following conclusions:
1. To resist replay attacks on the tag’s response, the response should be a
function of the reader’s “request” message containing a freshly generated
nonce.
2. To provide tag location privacy, the tag’s response should contain a nonce
generated by the tag.
3. To provide data privacy, the tag’s ID should be transmitted in the encrypted
form. The corresponding decryption function should be available to the
valid server only.
4. Since the tag corruption is an assumed attacker’s capability, the tag should
not store any secret data shared with other entities in the RFID system. In
particular, it means that symmetric-key cryptography should not be used as
the tag corruption will reveal a key used by the server to decrypt messages.
As a result, this will lead to the server impersonation attack.
5. To achieve forward- and backward-untraceability, the tag’s response in each
transaction should include some parameter that is not known to the attacker
at the moment of the tag’s corruption and that is not possible to calculate
for the particular transaction in the past or future based on the data at the
moment of corruption.
6. The use of hash functions for data encryption is not recommended as it
increases the complexity of the database look-up at least to O(N).
7. It is better to avoid desynchronization than to create means for re-
synchronization. A possible solution is to use static IDs for tags.
6.3 Core Idea
As in any RFID authentication protocol, the main challenge is to transmit the
tag’s identifier so that only authorized readers can correctly understand it and
hide it from eavesdroppers. Therefore, the transmitted information should be
encrypted. As discussed above, in case of symmetric encryption, the compromise
of the tag will reveal the secret key used. This will break the security of the whole
RFID system as the attacker will be able to decrypt all the communications. The
use of the one-way encryption (e.g., hash-functions) is not appreciated because
it will make the server do the same encryption operation in order to validate
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the tag’s response, thus increasing the complexity of the protocol in terms of
computations, time, and scalability.
Therefore, we propose to use lightweight asymmetric cryptography with the
easy-to-perform encryption operation for execution on the tag’s side. The message
sent from the tag to the server should encrypt the tag’s ID, the nonce generated
by the server, and the nonce generated by the tag. Once the server receives the
message from the tag, it decrypts the message, removes the nonce, and finally
extracts the tag’s ID. As the result, the tag does not change its ID after every
transaction, which avoids possible desynchronization. It is important to mention
that for the server it is not necessarily to know the tag’s nonce to check the
validity of the message – the resistance against replay attacks is guaranteed by
the nonce generated by the server. In other words, there is no need to transmit
the tag’s nonce in clear text to the server. The purpose of the tag’s nonce is to
provide protection against tracing. Since the nonce generated by the tag is not
transmitted in clear text, there is no possibility for the attacker to reconstruct
the valid tag’s reply, even if the tag was compromised earlier. This nonce remains
known to the tag only and only in the moment of the transaction.
The only way to generate a nonce for the tag is to use the built-in pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG). Unfortunately, true random number gen-
erators still remain an expensive solution. In general, the generation of the
pseudo-random number can be represented as:
Rand = PRNG (Seed),
where PRNG() is a deterministic function.
This means that for the known Seed the output of the PRNG will also be known
if the attacker knows the construction of PRNG. Thus, it is of special importance
because the current state of PRNG becomes known to the attacker once the tag
is compromised. Consequently, this would allow the attacker to reconstruct the
pseudo-random numbers generated by the tag in the following transactions after
the compromise, thus, violating the location privacy (see Forward-untraceability
property earlier in Sect. 3.2). This problem is described in details in Phan et
al. [57].
As a solution, we propose to generate the Seed based on the previously
generated pseudo-random number and the nonce from the server, i.e.,:
Seed = Rand XOR Nonce
Rand = PRNG (Seed),
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where Nonce is generated by the server.
Based on the proof from Lim and Kwon [1] that forward-untraceability is
possible to achieve only if the attacker misses at least one valid transaction with
the valid sever after the time of the compromise, the proposed scheme of the
PRNG provides forward-untraceability. Indeed, the loss of one valid transaction
will not allow the attacker to reconstruct the current state of PRNG and thus
will not allow tracing the tag.
This approach is described more detailed in the next section.
6.4 General Approach
The proposed above approach has two phases: initialization and authentication.
Below is the description of each of them.
Initialization.
1. The Server generates a pair of Public and Private keys {Kpub, Kpriv}. Both
keys are kept on the server.
2. The Server generates an identifier IDi of the tag Ti as a new random number
not used before. The length of the identifier is l. The server assigns IDi to
the tag Ti and transmits Kpub to the tag.
Authentication
1. The Server generates a random number R1 with the length l and transmits
it to the Tag.
2. The Tag computes a new seed and generates a random number R2 :
Seed = R2 XOR R1
R2 = PRNG (Seed)
3. The Tag computes the response M using the encryption function with the
public key Kpub as follows:
M = EncKpub((ID XOR R1) ‖ R2)
and sends M to the Server.
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4. The Server decrypts M using the private key Kpriv:
P = DecKpriv(M),
and removes l right bits, the result is Pleft.
5. The Server computes:
ID′ = Pleft XOR R1
and looks for ID’ in its database. Once ID’ is found and is legal, the server
authorizes the tag.
6.5 Mathematical Apparatus for Low-cost PKC
The approach described above is general and lacks details about the implemen-
tation of the asymmetric encryption/decryption. Since there have been com-
mon doubts about the feasibility of public-key cryptography (PKC) on RFID
tags [70, 71, 72], it is essential to provide a possible realization of the proposed
approach suitable for low-computational RFID tags.
In our approach, the only complex on-tag computation is encryption. The
decryption operation is performed on the powerful server side. Therefore, we were
looking for the implementation of the public-key cryptography where encryption
is easy to perform. Thus, we propose to use the Rabin cryptosystem, which has
been shown to be as secure as the integer factorization problem [73].
In the Rabin scheme, p and q are two large distinct primes that serve as the
private key; z = p ∗ q serves as the public key. Let A be a plaintext, then a
ciphertext c is produced by squaring A modulo z :
c = A2 mod z
In order to decrypt c, i.e., to find A given c and z, knowledge of p and q
is required. Due to the difficulty of factoring z, it is computationally infeasible
to find x, satisfying x2 = R mod n, without knowing p and q. However, the
decryption phase using the Chinese Remainder Theorem [74] gives four candidates
A’, satisfying c = (A′)2 mod z. Therefore, an indicator must exist in order for
the decryptor to choose the correct value A. Without a loss of generality, if A is
replaced with A2, the ciphertext is produced as:
c = (A2)2 mod z, where A2 < z.
6.6. Proposed Protocol 69
Among the decrypted values, there is only one solution that is a prefect
square [69]. The square root of this value is the original plaintext A. This
approach was shown in [75]. A detailed description of the Rabin scheme can be
found in [65].
From the efficiency point of view, encryption requires only two “square modulo
z” operations, which is suitable for computation on tags. A practical realization
of the Rabin scheme suitable for low-resource tags (also known as the WIPR
scheme) was shown in [76, 77] with the total area of 4,184 GE, including RAM,
which fits into the overall gate budget of 10,000 GE for passive RFID tags. The
efficient implementation is achieved by replacing a memory-expensive modular
reduction step by an addition of a large random multiple of z, i.e.
c = A2 + r ∗ z ,
where r is at least 80 bits larger than z.
It is important to mention that a possible alternative low-cost implementation
of the public key cryptography could be the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
However, as evaluated by Wenger et al. [78], the complete implementation of the
ECC on the microcontrollers requires between 16,786 and 32,034 GE including
RAM, which is beyond the limit of the EPC tags.
The resulting implementation of the proposed RFID authentication protocol
using the Rabin scheme is shown in the next section.
6.6 Proposed Protocol
In this section, we provide the formal definition of the proposed protocol. We use
the notations from Table 6.1. The protocol has three polynomial time algorithms:
server key generation (SetupServer), tag ID generation (SetupTag), and tag
authentication (Auth). The algorithm is depicted on Fig. 6.1.
- SetupServer(τ) → (Kpriv, Kpub, N): The server generates a name space
(N ) for tag identifiers and a private/public key pair (Kpriv, Kpub) for the server
depending on a security parameter τ . The private key (Kpriv) consists of a pair
of two large prime numbers p and q and is stored on the server side. The public
key (Kpub) is equal to z=p*q and is distributed among every tag Ti belonging to
the system.
- SetupTag(N, i) → (IDi): The server picks a unique tag identifier IDi from





Kpub = z = p ∗ q Public key
Kpriv = {p, q} Private key
IDi Identifier of Tag i
r1, r2 Random numbers
l Bit-length of ID, r1, r2
TR The set of tags in the system
N Namespace for the tags in the system⊕, XOR Exclusive OR
← Assignment operator
‖ Concatenation operator
Table 6.1: Notations and their description.
the name space N and assigns it to Ti. IDi is stored on S and Ti. Each assigned
IDi becomes a member of the set TR.
- Auth (Kpriv, TR, M) → (Output): The server authenticates the tag Ti,
whereby they interact as follows:
1. Server: S generates r1← PRNG() and sends it to Ti.
2. Tag: The tag Ti generates r2 ← PRNG(r2′
⊕
r1) as a temporary secret
for the session (for the very first session, r2′ is initially equal to 0), assigns











(a) Upon receiving M, the server finds four candidates X ′, satisfying
M ≡ X ′2 mod z, using the Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT) [74]
with the knowledge of Kpriv: {p, q}. Only one of these solutions
would be a perfect square. The square root of this solution would be a
quadratic residue X satisfying M ≡ (X2)2 mod z.
(b) Next, the server removes l right bits (where l – is the length of r2)
from X and XORs the resulted value with r1. Let the result of these
operations be IDi’.
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Figure 6.1: The proposed authentication protocol.
Finally, the server looks for the value IDi’ in the database (set TR). If IDi’ is
found, the algorithm returns Output = True. Otherwise, the algorithm returns ⊥.
6.7 Adding Ownership Transfer
In our protocol, the ownership is defined by the possession of a private key, corre-
sponding to the public key. Indeed, only the owner can decrypt communications
using the private key. Therefore, in order to transfer ownership, the following
steps have to be performed (see Fig. 6.2):
1. The current authentication sever (Sold) sends a request to the tag.
2. The tag generates X ← PRNG().
3. The tag sends M to the server:
M = (X2)2 mod z
4. The server finds X’ – the square root of the quadratic residue of M using
its current private key Kpriv (p, q).
5. Sold generates a new pair of public/private keys (Kpub, Kpriv): (z′, {p′, q′}),
where p′, q′ – two large primes, z′ = p′ ∗ q′, and sends back the decrypted
value X ′ concatenated with the new public key z′:
response = X ′ ‖ z′
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Figure 6.2: The proposed protocol for the ownership transfer.
6. If the left half of the response matches X, the server is authenticated and
the tag accepts the new public key (the right half of the response). The tag
replaces the old key with the new one.
7. The current server transmits the newKpriv and IDi to the new authentication
server. This operation is performed in a secure environment.
8. The new authentication server runs the first transaction with the tag and
changes Kpub and Kpriv, performing steps 1–6 described here.
Step 8 has to be performed to cause the update of the key pair (Kpub, Kpriv)
in order to avoid using the keys that are known to the previous authentication
server.
In the result of the ownership transfer protocol, the new owner is the only
entity that holds a new private key. Hence, the old owner has no access to the tag
and can no longer decrypt messages with the old key. Therefore, the ownership is
transferred to the new owner.
Note: During the ownership transfer phase, we consider that the attacker can
neither modify nor block messages. However, the attacker can eavesdrop the
channel between the tag and the server. The communication between the current
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and the new server is considered protected from eavesdropping.
6.8 Formal Analysis
Formal analysis is performed by analysing the possible attacker’s behaviour given
the attacker model and the attacks described in Chap. 4. The respective attacks
are represented using the game approach. We separate the analysis to Privacy
and Security properties.
6.8.1 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme provides anonymity.
Proof. To break anonymity, the goal of A is to extract T ’s ID from T ’s response
m. This goal cannot be achieved due to the one-way property of the Rabin
encryption. 
Definition 3 (Backward-untraceability game). A Backward-
untraceability game is defined as a privacy game G between a strong adversary A
and a collection of server and tag instances. This game allows the adversary A to
launch the Backward attack:
Phase 1 (Learning): The adversary randomly selects two valid tags T0
and T1 and calls any of the following queries at her wish to these tags for
the next (i-1)-sessions: Execute, SendTag, Modify. I.e., the adversary can
eavesdrop communications, query tags, modify/block messages at any of
the following (i-1)-sessions.
Phase 2 (Challenge):
1. At the session i during G, A randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. A is
given a tag Tb from the set {T0, T1}.
2. A makes a Corrupt (Tb) query.
Phase 3 (Guess): A terminates the game and outputs a bit b’ as its guess
of the value b. A wins the game if b’=b.
Definition 4 (Backward-untraceability). An RFID authentication scheme
provides backward-untraceability if there is no A who wins the Backward-
untraceability game with the probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥ 12 + e, where e is negligible.
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Theorem 2. The proposed authentication protocol provides backward untraceabil-
ity.
Proof. Let A compromise T0 at time i (i.e., A chooses a bit b=0 during the
Challenge phase). The adversary is given the message exchange between S and
T0 at time (i-1) denoted as
MEi−1={Request, M},
where Request is the message sent by S, M is the message sent by T0 back to
S.
The goal of the adversary is to link M with the data on T0, i.e., ID0 and
Kpub. Thus, the adversary attempts (1) to extract ID0 from M or (2) to compute
M given the knowledge of ID0 and Kpub only. The former is computationally
infeasible due to the one-way encryption property of the Rabin scheme: without
the knowledge of Kpriv, it is not possible to find the pre-image of M. The latter is
not possible because M contains a random number, freshly generated by T0. The
random number generated by T0 is unknown to A because it is never transmitted
in plain text. 
Definition 5 (Location privacy game). A Location privacy game is defined
as a privacy game G between a weak adversary A and a collection of server and
tag instances. This game allows the adversary A to launch the Location privacy
attack.
The description of the Location privacy game is similar to the Backward-
untraceability game with the exception that during the Phase 2 (Challenge),
Step 2, instead of Corrupt query, A makes any of the following queries: Execute,
SendTag.
Definition 6 (Location privacy). An RFID authentication scheme provides
location privacy if there is no A who wins the Location privacy game with the
probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥ 12 + e, where e is negligible.
Theorem 3. The proposed authentication protocol provides location privacy.
Proof. Let A choose a bit b=0 during the Challenge phase. The adversary is given
the message exchange between S and T0 at time (i-1) denoted as MEi−1={Request,
M}, where Request is the message sent by S, M is the message sent by T0 back
to S. Let A send the same Request to T0 at time i: SendTag (T0, i, Request) →
m’. A has a goal to link M with m’. This goal is not achieved because Reply and
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m’ are encrypted using different random numbers generated by T0. The random
number generated by T0 is unknown to A because it is never transmitted in plain
text. 
Definition 7 (Forward-untraceability game). A Forward-untraceability game
is defined as a privacy game G between a strong adversary A and a collection of
server and tag instances. This game allows the adversary A to launch the Forward
attack.
Phase 1 (Challenge):
1. At the session i, the adversary A randomly selects two valid tags T0
and T1 and randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. A is given a tag Tb
from the set {T0, T1}.
2. A makes a Corrupt (Tb) query.
Phase 2 (Learning): A calls any of the following queries at her wish to
T0 and T1 for the next (i+j-1)-sessions: Execute, SendTag, Modify. I.e., the
adversary can eavesdrop communications, query tags, modify/block mes-
sages at any of the following (i+j-1)-sessions. A misses at least one session,
during which A does not eavesdrop and does not call any queries (see the
assumption by Lim-Kwon [1]).
Phase 3 (Guess): A terminates the game and outputs a bit b’ as its guess
of the value b. A wins the game if b’=b.
Definition 8 (Forward-untraceability). An RFID authentication scheme pro-
vides Forward-untraceability if there is no A who wins the Forward-untraceability
game with the probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥ 12 + e, where e is negligible.
Theorem 4. The proposed authentication protocol provides forward-untraceability.
Proof. Let A compromise T0 at time i (i.e., A chooses a bit b=0 during the
Challenge phase). The adversary is given the message exchange between S and
T0 at time (i+j) denoted as
MEi+j={Request, M},
where Request is the message sent by S, M is the message sent by T0 back to
S.
A misses the session(s) at time p, where 0<p<j. The goal of A is to link M
with the data on T0, i.e., ID0, Kpub, and internal state of PRNG. Since A misses
at least one valid session with S, during which T0 updates the internal state of its
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PRNG based on the Request from S, A is unaware of the next random numbers,
generated by T0, and thus cannot compute the T0’s reply in the session at time
(i+j) based on the compromised data at time i. 
6.8.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse security protection properties of the proposed protocol
against Impersonation and Desynchronization attacks as per Definition 1.
Theorem 5. The proposed scheme is secure against Impersonation attacks.
Proof. As per Definition 1, A calls any of the queries Execute, SendTag, Modify
with the goal to impersonate T. A can impersonate T in two ways: (1) to find T ’s
ID from T ’s reply M or (2) to replay M on the Server’s query Q. The former is not
possible due to the one-way encryption function of the Rabin scheme. The latter
is not possible since the correct tag’s response depends on the random number
generated by S, which is included in the encrypted reply by T. The probability of
seeing the same query Q twice depends on the bit-length k of the random number
generated by S.
The probability P of seeing the same request Q of the bit-length k at least






∗ · · · ∗ (2k − (N − 1) )
(2k)N
The fraction converges to 1 when 2k is significantly larger in comparison to a
reasonable number of transactions N observed by the attacker. Therefore, the
probability P converges to 0. 
Theorem 6. The proposed scheme is secure against Desynchronization attacks.
Proof. As per Definition 1, A calls any of the queries Execute, SendTag, Modify,
Corrupt with the goal to make S output ⊥ at the end of the authentication
protocol Auth. In other words, A’s goal is to make a legitimate tag rejected by
the authentication server. Since tags do not update their IDs in the proposed
protocol, desynchronization is avoided. 
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6.9 Performance Analysis
Similar to the performance analyses of the existing works, we analyse the perfor-
mance of the proposed protocol in terms of computational and storage require-
ments, database look-up complexity as well as the amount of communication
flows.
Tag side
The following computational functions are called on the tag side:
1. PRNG – 1 call
2. XOR – 2 calls
3. Modular squaring – 2 calls
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: (1L + 1M) bit, where L is the maximum size of a
tag’s ID, M is the maximum size of the integer n (in bits).
2. Volatile memory: (2L+ 1M) bit.
Server side
The following computational functions are called on the server side:
1. PRNG – 1 call
2. XOR – 1 call
3. Solve quadratic residues – 1 call
Storage requirements:
1. Non-volatile memory: L ·N + 3M , where N is the number of tags in the
system.
2. Volatile memory: 4L+M
Database look-up complexity in the worst case: O(1). The protocol consists of
only two communication flows – the minimum for the challenge-response protocols.
6.10 Comparison
We compare the proposed protocol with the described existing works based on
the security and privacy properties they provide and based on their performance
characteristics.













Anonymity Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Location
privacy
No Yes No No Yes
Impersonation
attack
No Yes No Yes Yes
Desynchroni-
zation attack
No No No Yes Yes
Backward-
untraceability
Yes No No No Yes
Forward-
untraceability
No Yes Yes No Yes
Table 6.2: Comparison of Privacy and Security Properties. Yes: Proper-
ty/protection is provided/secured; No: property/protection is not provided.
We first compare privacy and security properties. Table 6.2 summarizes
security and privacy properties of the described above existing protocols as well
as the properties of the proposed protocol. This summary is based on the analysis
of vulnerabilities of the existing works presented in Chap. 5 and on the full formal
security and privacy analyses of the proposed protocol.
As can be seen from Table 6.2, our proposed protocol satisfies all the security
and privacy properties required from RFID authentication protocols. It provides
anonymity, location privacy, is resistant to impersonation and desynchronization
attacks, is backward- and forward-untraceable.
Finally, we compare the protocols based on their performance. In particular,
we compare the amount and form of computations, amount of communication
flows, and complexity of database look-up. We summarize the performance
characteristics in Table 6.3.
The performance comparison shows that our scheme outperforms the existing
works in the amount of communication flows, calculations on tags and on the
server, and achieves the complexity for database loading of O(1) in the worst case.
The use of the lightweight functions and a low complexity of the protocol design




















































In this dissertation, we have investigated the problem of the secure and privacy-
friendly authentication in the technology of Radio-frequency identification.
Indeed, RFID was developed in order to provide cheap, fast, and automatic
identification of objects. This has resulted in the variety of fields where RFID is
applied: tracking of items during the transportation, identification of objects in
warehouses, contactless payments, and many others. RFID has made identification
of items faster and more reliable in comparison to traditional barcodes. One of
the main advantages of RFID is that it does not require line-of-sight in order to
identify an object. This, in particular, means that an RFID tag can be in any
position on or inside an object; the packaging material or dirt will not disturb the
process of identification. We have summarised the fundamentals and benefits of
RFID in Chapter 2.
However, to provide fast identification, the technology applies a minimalistic
approach: the bearers of identification information are simple low-cost tags that
transmit their IDs to every reader that queries them. Originally, RFID does not
provide any means for tags to authenticate the reader. Moreover, due to their
simplicity, tags respond with unencrypted messages. This, in turn, violates security
and privacy of communications. The following security and privacy threats are
generally considered in RFID: absence of anonymity, traceability, impersonation
attacks, desynchronization attacks, forward- and backward-traceability. We review
these threats and their influence on users and business processes in Chapter 3.
Based on them, we present an attacker model and formulate security and privacy
requirements for RFID authentication protocols in Chapter 4.
In addition to the attacker model, in Chapter 4, we provide feasibility require-
ments for RFID authentication protocols that aim to be compatible with the EPC
Class-1 Gen-2 Standard. This standard is applied for those low-cost tags that are
going to replace barcodes on the item level. Due to the low computational and
storage capabilities of EPC tags, the standard limits the use of computations to
simple arithmetic operations in addition to the PRNG on-board. The standard
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makes the following general restriction: the upper bound for the chip area is 2000
Gate Equivalents (GE) for security purposes and 10000 GE – for the overall gate
budget.
In Chapter 5, we have investigated four existing authentication protocols that
attempted to achieve security and privacy in RFID using lightweight functions only.
Conducted vulnerability analyses has shown that none of these schemes satisfies
all the security and privacy requirements for RFID authentication protocols.
Based on the vulnerability analyses of the existing works, in Chapter 6, we have
formulated conclusions on how to design a secure and privacy-friendly authentica-
tion protocol in RFID. In particular, we formulate our conclusions concerning how
to achieve protection against various security and privacy attacks, what influences
the protocol complexity, and how to protect against desynchronization.
As a contribution of this dissertation, we have proposed a minimalist RFID
authentication protocol based on Quadratic residues. The proposed approach
addresses two challenges – (1) to design a robust secure and private authentication
protocol and (2) to achieve compliance with EPC Class-1 Gen-2. In particular, the
scheme uses modular squaring (which is replaced by addition and multiplication
in the practical implementation [77]), XOR, and PRNG functions that meet
computational constraints of EPC Class-1 Gen-2 passive RFID tags.
Privacy and Security analysis of the proposed scheme shows that it overcomes
the flaws of the previous works and achieves the required properties of the tag
anonymity, location privacy, backward- and forward-untraceability while being
resistant to impersonation and desynchronization attacks. In addition, we have
presented an ownership transfer protocol that allows tags to change owners so
that the old owner can neither authenticate nor trace the tag anymore.
The performance comparison shows that our scheme outperforms the ex-
isting works in the amount of communication rounds, calculations on tags
and on the server, and achieves the complexity for database loading of
O(1) in the worst case. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
lightweight protocol for RFID authentication that provides forward- and backward-
untraceability at the same time, and is robust against security and pri-
vacy attacks generally considered in RFID systems. The implementation of
this scheme has the potential to strongly enhance privacy and security of
RFID-based transactions insuring that the privacy of users is not violated.
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Our future work will target the following directions of research:
1. Verification of the security and privacy properties of proposed protocol with
the compliance to the recently proposed Untraceability model by Avoine et
al. [79].
2. Simulation of the proposed protocol in the network simulation environment,
e.g., NS-3. This simulation would allow us to evaluate the authentication
delay and other performance parameters. The example of the modelling of
RFID entities and their communications on different layers in NS-3 is the
work by El Moustaine [80].
3. Design and implementation of the proposed protocol on EPC C1G2-
compatible tags. This could verify the compatibility of the proposed protocol
with the EPC C1G2 standard. The starting point for this direction can be
a study by Arbit et al. [77].
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